AGSI offers pragmatic, targeted policy recommendations for the Trump administration to maximize U.S. political and economic influence with the crucial emerging regional powers in the Gulf.
President Donald J. Trump, fifth left, attends a group photo session with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, fourth right, UAE Crown Prince Khaled bin Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, second right, Bahraini Crown Prince and Prime Minister Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, left, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, third left, Kuwaiti Emir Meshal al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah, second left, GCC Secretary-General Jasem Albudaiwi, right, during the GCC Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 14. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon)
In May, President Donald J. Trump traveled to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. This pivotal trip demonstrated the favorable opportunity that Trump’s second term in office presents for the United States to create deeper and more profitable relations with the countries of the Gulf. While the United States remains the dominant political, security, economic, and cultural power, Gulf countries are networking their economic, trade, and – in some cases – security ties more widely in the region and Asia. Acting now to solidify a new basis for U.S.-Gulf relations focused on expanding two-way investment in technology and forging greater Gulf responsibility for security will extend U.S. security and economic influence in the Gulf for another generation.
The Middle East is a much different place than it was eight years ago, at the start of Trump’s first term, and the president’s trip to the Gulf in May makes clear there is a changed geopolitical and economic environment that opens up significant opportunities. Gulf states have risen as key regional players and are poised to take advantage of a coming power rebalance in the region. While Iran and Iran-supported militias still threaten U.S. and Gulf interests, Iran’s ability to project strategic power in the region has been significantly reduced in the past year, and the fall of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria has cut Iran’s supply line to proxy forces in the Levant. These developments present the real possibility that U.S. negotiations with Iran could facilitate a new nuclear and security deal. Gulf states have engaged in detente-like diplomacy with Tehran to ensure stability for their own domestic development projects, yet they also seek stronger security partnerships with the United States. With confidence in these arrangements, Gulf states can play a central role in stabilizing the region’s other conflict zones – Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza – through humanitarian aid and support to new governments, even as they absorb popular concern at home over violence in Gaza. The president’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria opens a new chapter of possibilities for Gulf countries, and they will undoubtedly seek to understand U.S. priorities with Damascus as they proceed to test out reconstruction and investment opportunities.
The Gulf can be, in essence, an alignment of friends of the United States that could complement its Asian counterparts – Japan, South Korea, Australia, and, potentially, India. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have emerged as the most influential power brokers and economic movers in the Middle East. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar play significant roles in protecting regional security, and Oman is successfully transforming its economy on a budget.
While China is competing for trade and investment in the Gulf, other Asian countries, including U.S. allies and India, also seek economic opportunities. Creating U.S.-Gulf business partnerships in technology and artificial intelligence as well as logistics networks between the Gulf and Washington’s Asian and European allies will give the Gulf more options than China to choose from.
Finally, the societies of the Gulf are undergoing fast and fundamental evolutions, and U.S. culture and education as well as the English language dominate Gulf elites. While ongoing social changes are largely top-down, they enjoy significant support from Gulf populations who now have new opportunities for employment, sports, and entertainment that their parents did not have.
The Arab Gulf States Institute suggests that the Trump administration consider implementing the policies outlined below to maximize U.S. political and economic influence with the crucial emerging regional powers in the Gulf.
Senior Resident Scholars Hussein Ibish, Kristin Smith Diwan, and Robert Mogielnicki; Senior Fellow Ali Alfoneh; Non-Resident Fellow Gregory D. Johnsen; Executive Vice President Ambassador William Roebuck; and members of AGSI’s board of directors all contributed to this policy framework.
Ambassador Douglas A. Silliman President and CEO Arab Gulf States Institute
Expanding Benefits of Gulf Economic Ties to the United States
The Gulf states have strong shared interests in the success of a growing U.S. economy and strong U.S.-Gulf economic ties rather than turning to China. Washington is a larger source of foreign investment to the Gulf, U.S. assets occupy a greater portion of Gulf sovereign wealth fund portfolios and provide greater potential for growth, most Gulf oil is traded in U.S. dollars, and all Gulf currencies are at least partially pegged to the dollar.
Innovation-Led U.S. Cooperation With the Gulf
Gulf governments possess lofty technology ambitions and are actively positioning their countries to be regional and global leaders in AI and other emerging technologies by funding, developing, and deploying new tech. The UAE occupies the fifth spot in a ranking of global AI leaders by Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI. Nascent industries around electric vehicles, data centers, advanced manufacturing, and even space are taking shape from within the region. Gulf projects to enhance critical mineral supply chain resilience are crucial for both U.S. and regional tech economies.
While Gulf countries enjoy an international network of tech partners, as Trump’s May trip showed, the United States remains the Gulf’s partner of choice for now. Regional tech firms and sovereign wealth funds have formed strategic investment partnerships with premier U.S. tech firms, such as Microsoft and Google, to advance tech-focused development strategies. Moreover, Gulf states – especially the UAE – are increasingly defining their relationship with the United States in tech-focused and geoeconomic terms. More energy efficient AI models, such as China’s DeepSeek-R1, and other emerging technologies could quickly alter these fundamental dynamics. In this fast-moving space, it is critical that the United States set the parameters for U.S.-Gulf cooperation, including ensuring the protection of U.S.-developed AI technology from exploitation as part of a new AI policy approach.
China’s Regional Role Amid Broader Gulf-Asia Relations
Relations between Gulf and Asian countries are multifaceted and growing. Robust Asian energy imports represent the core of these relations, but Gulf-Asia cooperation extends to technology, finance, infrastructure, and tourism.
China is a key partner in many of these spheres. Beijing views the Gulf as a critical source of energy and a promising market to generate more overseas revenue. Beijing has also sought to increase its global profile through engagement in the Gulf, including helping to broker a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Despite U.S.-China economic competition, both countries share a number of goals in the region: stability, prevention of new conflicts, secure shipping corridors, and economic development across the Middle East. These shared strategic goals can provide a basis for some cooperation.
U.S. or Chinese efforts perceived as forcing Gulf governments to make a binary choice will face resistance. Yet Washington enjoys substantial leverage in its corporate and economic partnerships with Gulf countries: China rarely offers viable alternatives to the United States in areas of strategic significance to Gulf governments.
Gulf governments also enjoy strong relations with other Asian countries. India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are major economic partners. Some Gulf governments are deepening their involvement with BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – multilateral groupings that include both strategic competitors and close partners of the United States as member states.
Recommendations for Tech and Investment Policy
Promote Collaboration, Especially in Tech:
Encourage innovation-focused collaboration between U.S. companies and universities and the Gulf to support skills transfers, sustainable economic growth, and crucial economic diversification initiatives desired by Gulf governments.
Facilitate U.S. company joint investment with Gulf firms in mining and processing critical minerals and rare earths in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere.
Actively encourage U.S. companies that are looking for a location to test live deployment of new technologies to collaborate with the Gulf. The Department of Commerce as well as U.S. and Gulf business and trade associations should identify and facilitate such opportunities.
Clarify Chip Export and AI Policy:
Develop a clear strategy to protect U.S. AI technology by supporting private workshops hosted by AGSI (and others) to bring government officials, tech developers, and regional experts together to develop specific policy options in this rapidly evolving space. This will allow U.S. partners and allies in the Gulf and beyond to meet the conditions and standards deemed necessary by Washington to mitigate risks.
Negotiate with the Gulf states a detailed set of intellectual property rights protections and security arrangements for the sale and protection of AI-capable chips from U.S. companies. These can start as bilateral agreements but should be expanded to any new country that pursues the same technology. Gulf states must commit to protecting advanced U.S. tech to prolong their and U.S. comparative advantage in AI and data.
Think Beyond Tech and AI:
Boost Gulf investments in the United States by supporting the new Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States fast track pilot process for allied and partner sources with in-depth research and insights on Gulf investment strategies and objectives, including those of Gulf sovereign wealth funds.
Encourage U.S. private sector commercial cooperation and investment in Gulf energy transition and sustainable development, including renewables, carbon capture, critical minerals, and, with proper safeguards, civilian nuclear power generation.
Conduct, through the Department of Commerce, more frequent trade missions and reverse trade missions in sectors of greatest interest to Gulf states – AI applications, logistics, green energy, carbon capture, health care, infrastructure, food security, and water desalination and reuse.
Exploit Overlapping U.S. and Chinese Interests:
Support diplomatic engagement to build regional consensus around responsible sovereign digital currency development and interoperability. Engage Gulf central banks, ministries of finance, and tech developers to promote transparency, accountability, and integration with the global financial system.
Trade and Logistics Corridors Diversify U.S.-Gulf Links to the Global Economy
New economic corridors are emerging within and across the Gulf region. Among these is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which aims to develop a land-sea logistics corridor from India, across the Indian Ocean and Arabian Peninsula to the Mediterranean Sea, then on to Europe. The Arab-Israeli segment of this transregional initiative will be a political challenge and almost certainly require further movement on relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The separate Development Road project seeks to create a trade corridor through the Gulf, Iraq, and Turkey to the Mediterranean. Qatar and the UAE are supporting parts of this project. Similar ideas are being discussed in minilateral groupings, such as I2U2, comprised of India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States.
The UAE, in particular, has sought to enhance its trade and investment connectivity with key global markets over recent years. The UAE has signed a series of Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (similar to but more limited than free trade agreements) with individual countries in Africa and Asia. The UAE finalized such an agreement with Australia in November 2024. The Gulf Cooperation Council’s focus on GCC free trade agreements has paved the way for Gulf countries to deepen trade and investment with Latin American, European, African, and Asian countries.
Recommendations for Gulf Trade Policy
Deepen U.S. Involvement in Interregional Trade Corridors:
Increase U.S. diplomatic and private sector engagement with the GCC Secretariat and GCC member states (and nonmember Iraq) to encourage GCC cross-border linkages of rail lines, road networks, electricity grids, and other projects to expand the logistics capacity of the Gulf with U.S. support, particularly on projects tied to IMEC, I2U2, and other transregional logistics expansion efforts.
Engage outside contractors to provide low-cost orientation and business environment training to U.S. government trade promotion officers assigned to the Middle East. This will help the U.S. government better advise U.S. businesses seeking to take advantage of opportunities in the Gulf.
Strengthening Regional Stability at a Lower Cost
Gulf states are in an unusually complex and indeterminate security environment. In the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, Gulf Arab countries became frontline states in the confrontation with Iran. Some Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, have sought stronger security ties with the United States but have simultaneously also developed a reticence to relying solely on U.S. security protection and U.S.-led containment regimes.
Most Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have reestablished diplomatic relations and developed their own independent bilateral dialogues with Iran, as they sought to manage the risks of their frontline status. They are balancing these renewed relations with continued participation in a U.S.-led, sanctions-based containment regime in a quest for security and stability. Most Gulf Arab states are investing heavily in domestic economic transformations, and those transitions require long-term regional stability and the avoidance of conflict. Nonetheless, they continue to oppose malign aspects of Iran’s behavior, especially Iran’s missile and drone capability as well as its support for weakened nonstate militias in Arab countries, even as they also seek to mitigate the threat from Sunni jihadist organizations. The Gulf states view themselves as crucial partners with Washington in maintaining security in the waterways surrounding the Arabian Peninsula and the three key chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Suez Canal.
Gulf states support U.S. negotiations with Iran to reach a new nuclear deal – as well as constraints on Iranian support for its damaged proxy network in the Middle East – and the Trump administration appears to be coordinating its steps with Iran with Gulf partners. Gulf states also welcome the opportunity to trade and invest – with caution – in Iran.
Despite the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks in Israel and Israel’s massive kinetic response, the normalization of relations between Israel and Gulf states still offers benefits for both sides, though the Gaza war has raised Israel’s price of entry, particularly with Saudi Arabia. Without movement toward a Palestinian state, in tandem with significant reform in Palestinian governance, Gulf states will remain slow to rebuild Gaza but seem to be more willing to help in Lebanon and Syria.
For well over a year the Houthi militia that controls northern Yemen has attacked commercial shipping in the Red Sea, leading to decreased shipping traffic, higher insurance premiums for vessels, and other increased shipping costs. The United States initially responded with a defense only approach, patrolling in the Red Sea and shooting down Houthi missiles and drones. When that proved ineffective, the United States attempted to deter and degrade the Houthis’ capabilities by striking missile launchers and weapons caches. Neither of these approaches, however, have ended the attacks, although the massive U.S. bombing campaign from March to May convinced the Houthis to cease attacks on U.S. flagged vessels. The Houthi threat remains a challenge to U.S. allies Egypt – because of a significant loss of Suez Canal revenue for the government – and Israel – because the threat of further Houthi attacks persists.
Recommendations for Gulf Security and Geopolitical Policy
Put in Place Security Guarantees With Greater Gulf Self-Reliance:
Update the 1980 Carter Doctrine to provide structure and predictability to U.S. security actions and the reciprocal responsibilities and burden sharing for Gulf Arab partners.
As diplomatic openings and the ongoing war in Gaza permit, pursue a trilateral U.S.-Israel-Saudi deal that involves a U.S.-Saudi security agreement. Follow up with a similar agreement with the UAE. Variations on the U.S.-Bahrain Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement may provide an easier entrance for other Gulf states.
Negotiate bespoke arms and military technology sales with Gulf states to enhance their ability to integrate, interoperate, and coordinate military training and operations with the United States and each other.
Streamline U.S. arms and dual-use export regulations for partner countries, including the Gulf.
Secure specific and binding Gulf agreements to protect U.S. military technology.
Pledge that the United States will bring its unique capabilities in air defense, maritime security, and intelligence in support of Gulf states when needed.
Strengthen Diplomatic Ties:
Commit to Vice President JD Vance or Secretary of State Marco Rubio chairing the annual meeting of the U.S.-GCC Summit on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025.
Renew the U.S.-GCC working group covering defense, economic, and cultural issues to promote stronger integration among GCC states.
Pass through the Congress approval of a diplomatic mission for the GCC in Washington.
Support Regional Integration and Cooperation:
Incentivize Gulf states to integrate into the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s digital ocean network and other maritime security mechanisms.
Continue U.S. negotiations with Iran to secure as clear a path as possible to prevent Iran from developing and building a nuclear weapon. See Recommendations for Iran Policy section.
Support Postconflict Stabilization and Normalization:
Maintain the possibility of a U.S.-Saudi security agreement to find a formula that can bring about the normalization of ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel. In addition to some kind of extended cease-fire and de-escalation in Gaza, this is likely to require an Israeli agreement to some progress toward a Palestinian state.
In Gaza, work with Gulf partners, particularly the UAE, to provide personnel and other support for an international force to secure postconflict Gaza, when conditions permit. Work with all Gulf partners to provide humanitarian and reconstruction support.
In Syria, secure agreement, especially from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar to provide humanitarian assistance to returning Syrian refugees, solidify the economy, and stabilize the political landscape in the country. Work with key stakeholders, including in Congress, to continue implementation of the president’s decision, articulated in Riyadh, to lift U.S. sanctions on Syria.
In Lebanon, partner with Gulf governments to provide assistance and political support to strengthen Lebanese institutions, particularly the Lebanese Armed Forces, and reduce the possibility of the return of a strong Iranian-supported sectarian organization like Hezbollah.
Limit Weapons to and Increase International Pressure on the Houthis:
Work with Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the U.N.-recognized government of Yemen to interdict and stop the overland flow of weapons and technology from Iran to the Houthis.
Encourage NATO allies and regional partners to increase patrols in and around the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea to further limit Iranian resupply of the Houthis and defend commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
Work with Egypt to coordinate Arab and regional political opposition to Houthi attacks on shipping bound for the Suez Canal.
Through Omani mediators, make clear the Houthis will be held responsible for any further attacks on Israel or destabilizing attacks in the Red Sea.
Prospects for a U.S.-Iran Deal
Trump’s second term marks a paradigm shift in the U.S. approach to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Strategically, Iran is in a considerably weakened geopolitical position. Iran’s principal deterrent force, Lebanese Hezbollah, a linchpin in its asymmetric defense doctrine and a central pillar of its deterrence-by-proxy strategy, has suffered major setbacks, largely as a result of successful Israeli intelligence operations and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, eroding Hezbollah’s capacity to project power and weakening Iran’s “axis of resistance.”
Iran’s conventional missile capabilities have proved inadequate in the face of Israel’s robust, multitiered air defense architecture. These systems, in tandem with extensive U.S. military support, have effectively neutralized the threat posed by Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles, highlighting the limitations of Iran’s ability to strike Israel.
Domestically, the regime faces mounting internal legitimacy crises, manifesting in social protests and civil disobedience. Structural deficiencies in the state’s governance capacity have exacerbated center-periphery tensions and ethnic grievances. Most pressing, however, is the catastrophic depreciation of the national currency, the rial, which has sharply reduced purchasing power and deepened socioeconomic stratification.
However, Trump is also confronting a regime that has significantly advanced its nuclear capabilities. These technical advancements position Iran closer than ever to achieving nuclear latency: the capacity to rapidly weaponize its nuclear program without yet having crossed the threshold of open weaponization.
Furthermore, Arab allies, particularly the GCC states, which opposed the JCPOA, have engaged in tactical rapprochements with Tehran to insulate themselves from escalation in the event of a confrontation between the United States and Iran. And they now appear to be mediating between the two adversaries.
In this altered strategic landscape, Trump faces a dual challenge: a regime that is increasingly fragile in conventional terms but potentially emboldened by its latent nuclear capability. Managing this paradox will require a recalibration of U.S. coercive diplomacy, deterrence posture, and alliance management in the Middle East.
Recommendations for Iran Policy
Prevent nuclear weaponization through diplomatic and deterrent measures.
Pair coercion with calibrated incentives. Sanctions should remain in place to penalize destabilizing behavior, but phased relief should be offered in exchange for verifiable modifications in Iran’s nuclear activities.
Undermine proxy networks by strengthening governance and bolstering local security institutions in states such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.
Engage Europe, Russia, China, and key regional actors in parallel diplomatic tracks while retaining unilateral coercive tools to influence Iranian behavior without compromising U.S. strategic autonomy.
Provide Israel and the GCC states with the means to protect themselves against potential aggression from Iran.
Recognizing and Supporting the Evolution of Gulf Societies
An abiding fact of Gulf life is the cultural dominance of the United States. English remains the lingua franca of the Gulf elites, and American universities remain preeminent in training and educating those elites.
Gulf states have begun to welcome greater diversity and are investing in new areas of the knowledge and creative economy far from their traditional concerns of oil and security. In Saudi Arabia, tourism and entertainment make up well over half of the country’s gigaproject investments. The UAE has ambitions in future-oriented industries from space exploration to cryptocurrency and AI to renewable energy and green technologies. The other Gulf states share in these moves toward greater economic diversification and boast their own initiatives in technology, culture, and tourism.
The expansion into “soft” industries provides the Gulf states with a vehicle for changing their international image and reaching new audiences and partners of wealth and influence. For the United States, it generates the opportunity for a different means of productive collaboration. These cultural openings also reinforce the current trajectory away from religious extremism.
Recommendations for Gulf Cultural and Societal Policy
Expand Cultural Collaboration and Promote Related Investment:
Expand English-language and educational exchange programs, low-cost initiatives that build personal ties between Gulf citizens and the United States.
Implement new State Department public affairs programming with new Gulf creative institutions through exchange and other programs that connect them with American creative talent and expertise.
Promote mutually beneficial investments between U.S. creative, sports, gaming, and entertainment industries with the rapidly expanding creative and entertainment fields in the Gulf.
The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.
In May, President Donald J. Trump embarked on a trip to the Gulf that signals a new era in U.S.-Gulf relations. AGSI's A New Gulf Partnership series explores the ways U.S. strategic relations with these countries are evolving and offers policy recommendations for the U.S. administration to maximize political and economic influence.
President Trump’s May trip to the Gulf showed the need to supplant the outdated Carter Doctrine with a new Trump Doctrine that focuses on reciprocal economic partnerships, security burden sharing, and the transformation of Gulf societies while still ensuring energy flows.
Saudi Arabia seeks a U.S. security umbrella strong enough to deter Iran but a diplomatic posture measured enough to avoid provoking Iran unnecessarily.
An Iraqi-born native of Najaf but an unmistakably Iranian nationalist, Ali Larijani is expected to leverage his record of bureaucratic competence and global fluency to coordinate Iran’s security bureaucracy.
Confronted with the clear and present danger posed by Israel, Iran’s collective leadership appears mired in policy paralysis, leaving Iran strategically adrift.
When the Saudi crown prince meets President Trump in Washington, the main topics of discussion are likely to be commercial deals, a defense pact, a Saudi civilian nuclear program, and normalization with Israel.
Saudi Arabia’s first Cultural Investment Conference sought to convince domestic and global investors that arts and culture in the kingdom are a value proposition and to entice them to share in this project.
An apology from Israel’s prime minister – delivered under the watchful eye of President Trump in the Oval Office – and a written promise of a U.S. response if Qatar is attacked go a long way toward restoring Qatar's deterrence and bolstering its security and stability following the Israeli attack.
When the Saudi crown prince meets President Trump in Washington, the main topics of discussion are likely to be commercial deals, a defense pact, a Saudi civilian nuclear program, and normalization with Israel.
The GCC states now consider an attack on one to be an attack on all, and Saudi Arabia may be covered by a Pakistani rather than U.S. military umbrella.
The Southern Transitional Council is betting that if the South can be united under its leadership it can cordon the South off from the Houthis in the North, utilize oil and gas revenue, and create a stable and functioning state.
By attacking the Houthis’ support system, the United States can use indirect means to accomplish what it couldn’t through direct military intervention.
U.S. authorizations for exporting advanced chips to the leading Gulf technology firms is sure to please regional authorities, who will push to broaden and accelerate technology collaboration with the United States.
When the Saudi crown prince meets President Trump in Washington, the main topics of discussion are likely to be commercial deals, a defense pact, a Saudi civilian nuclear program, and normalization with Israel.
Participation in new country groupings offers the UAE additional avenues to navigate reconfigurations in global trade and reinforce economic partnerships.
Syria’s challenge moving ahead will be the difficult effort to develop a political system that will empower Syria’s people to embrace the more pedestrian but necessary political compromises upon which inclusion and representative government are based.
The recent visit by the Saudi crown prince to Washington turbocharged prospects for U.S.-led mediation on Sudan, but the case for skepticism remains compelling.
While the Syrian president is the one coming to Washington, he and President Trump each have flipped the script, surprising skeptics with bold action and fresh approaches, opening a desperately needed conversation on Syria.
President Trump’s May trip to the Gulf showed the need to supplant the outdated Carter Doctrine with a new Trump Doctrine that focuses on reciprocal economic partnerships, security burden sharing, and the transformation of Gulf societies while still ensuring energy flows.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein’s public outreach and official meetings seem to have put Iraq back on the policy agenda in Washington. But both sides will need to take further steps to sustain the positive momentum.
Iraq’s final reparations payment to Kuwait may open the door to increased cooperation, but competing visions and shared security concerns will shape the future.
