The conflict in Yemen has exacted a disastrous toll on the country. This paper considers the outside forces in the conflict, seeking to elucidate who they are, what the nature is of their involvement, and what their converging and conflicting interests mean for reconstruction.
View of the damaged Mercedes Benz building in Aden, Yemen, Feb. 17 (AP Photo/Nariman El-Mofty)
Recommendations
A coordinated and unified GCC response to postconflict reconstruction in Yemen will be essential to meeting the country’s political and economic requirements.
Yemen’s long-term economic viability will be greatly enhanced if the GCC extends some of its membership privileges, such as tariff relief for exports from Yemen and labor concessions.
Yemen’s political culture of patronage, especially from foreign influence, is likely to persist. To reduce the tendency to play one foreign patron against another, patron-client relationships between foreign states and local governorates and armed groups must be centralized into state agencies or federal units, to bring legitimacy to government, not warlords, militias, or sectarian actors.
One effective mechanism to restore legitimacy to local governments and limit discrepancies in regional access to relief, including the disbursement of salaries, is an effort to increase transparency in the amount and distribution of aid funds by region and local governments at the municipal level.
A central tenet of any reconstruction program should be setting realistic goals. While the temptation may be to aim for major infrastructure projects like ports, airports, and free zones, small-scale projects like sanitation rehabilitation, localized solar power grids, infrastructure or public building repair, and small roads projects of the kind the World Bank is engaged in are far more likely to provide tangible benefits.
Local needs assessments should be conducted in conjunction with local communities to ensure maximum possible buy-in.
The Iran conflict has arrived at the worst possible moment for Gulf sustainable finance, a sector already navigating fiscal strain, a global ESG backlash, and the unresolved tension between hydrocarbon revenue and transition capital.
On April 14, AGSI will host a discussion on how the Gulf Arab states can transition from crisis management to position themselves for sustainable postconflict growth.
The imperative for Gulf states to unify their position has grown since the onset of Iranian attacks on their countries. Yet under conditions of uncertainty about the U.S. position and the war's outcome, Gulf states are demonstrating differing regional alignments and preferences for managing the crisis.
Caught between Iranian strikes and U.S.-Israeli pressure to join the fight, Gulf Arab states strive to maintain their autonomy over decision making, playing defense and preserving the space to maneuver when the war ends.
When the Saudi crown prince meets President Trump in Washington, the main topics of discussion are likely to be commercial deals, a defense pact, a Saudi civilian nuclear program, and normalization with Israel.
On January 8, AGSI hosted a virtual roundtable with its leadership and scholars as they look ahead and assess trends likely to shape the Gulf region and U.S. foreign policy during the coming year.
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi urged President Trump not to attack Iran, but now that the war is into its second month, leaving the current situation in place would be an unthinkable fiasco for them.
Though they were unsuccessful in preventing the current conflict, and, as expected, have been dragged into the U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran, Gulf Arab countries remain crucial to hopes for limiting the war and bringing it to a quick resolution.
After decades of tolerating Hezbollah’s warmaking independence, the current crisis has compelled Lebanese leaders to ban its military activities; this project will do much to determine the reach Iran can maintain in the Arab world.
Gulf Arab countries urged the United States not to strike Iran, but now that is happening, they are in danger of being sucked into a conflict they cannot control but that will likely reshape their present and future realities.
On January 8, AGSI hosted a virtual roundtable with its leadership and scholars as they look ahead and assess trends likely to shape the Gulf region and U.S. foreign policy during the coming year.
On June 19, UAE-backed Yemeni forces announced that they had consolidated their control over Hodeidah airport after a week of fierce fighting with Houthi rebels for the facility as part of Operation Golden Victory, a military campaign for Hodeidah port and city.
December brought some of the biggest shifts in Yemen’s civil war since a Saudi-led coalition entered the conflict in March 2015. On Dec. 4, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed by members of the Zaydi Shiite Houthi movement with whom he had been allied until just a couple of days before. His death has...
Critics worry that the Trump administration’s threat to designate the Houthis as terrorists would also undermine humanitarian efforts, while President-elect Biden is expected to return to more robust diplomacy.
As Iran contemplates its response to the killing of Major General Qassim Suleimani, it will likely look to an asymmetric response employing resources in the region, such as the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Griffiths provided his unique insights into the U.N.-led effort to bring the principal combatants to a negotiated ceasefire and move the country toward a sustained, political solution.
AGSI explains what Israel’s sudden and massive attack on Iran is likely to mean for Gulf Arab states, Iran, the United States, and global and regional economies.
This post is part of an AGSIW series on Saudi Vision 2030, a sweeping set of programs and reforms adopted by the Saudi government to be implemented by 2030. Saudi Arabia did one thing right this week. It is seeing some positive news in the return on investment in its outwardly placed capital in new technology....
This post is part of an AGSIW series on Saudi Vision 2030, a sweeping set of programs and reforms adopted by the Saudi government to be implemented by 2030. While an Aramco initial public offering (IPO) has moved to the backburner of Saudi Arabia’s, and more importantly, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s, priorities, there have been...
