Iran Backs Diplomacy With Threats of Disruption

Much like President Donald J. Trump’s dual-track rhetoric toward Iran – alternating between coercive threats and inducements, such as the prospect of sanctions relief – Iran has adopted a tactic of strategic ambiguity. Tehran is projecting a willingness to engage in diplomacy over its nuclear program while simultaneously issuing threats to disrupt maritime oil shipments in the Gulf in the event of U.S. military escalation. 

•  May 13: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on the IRGC navy‘s new defense plan for the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Mousa islands, emphasizing Iran’s “active deterrence and layered regional defense” approach. 
• May 14: Tabnak News Agency, which is close to former IRGC Chief Mohsen Rezaei, in an article explaining the “active deterrence” approach, intimated that Iran would target oil shipments traveling through the Gulf if Iran is attacked. 

• May 14: Supreme National Security Council-affiliated Nour News Agency reported that Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, in a response to President Donald J. Trump’s May 13 address at the U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum, stated: 

• • “Regrettably, a highly misleading narrative was articulated: Trump is endeavoring to frame Iran as a source of regional instability, yet who bears responsibility for the deaths of over 60,000 individuals in Gaza? The unsuccessful ‘maximum pressure’ strategy has proved ineffective in altering Iran’s strategic calculus.”  

• • Referring to Trump’s praise of Arab states’ economic and societal development, Araghchi stated: “Our current economic challenges stem from coercive and extraterritorial U.S. sanctions not from endogenous policy failures.” 

• • Araghchi underscored that “indirect negotiations” with the United States remain ongoing. He also affirmed Iran’s readiness to engage in diplomatic dialogue with European actors, but he added: “Regrettably, the Europeans have rendered themselves peripheral due to their own strategic decisions. However, this is not an outcome we seek.” Araghchi also stated that Iranian and European deputy foreign ministers are scheduled to convene May 16 in Istanbul. 

• May 14: A senior negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi, was quoted by Tasnim News Agency while speaking at the Tehran Book Fair: 

• • “We have only just commenced substantive discussion regarding the scope and scale of uranium enrichment activities. However, we have conveyed that, as part of reciprocal confidence-building measures, we are willing to accept limited restrictions on enrichment capacity and other nuclear dimensions for a defined duration … Such a measure would not be unilateral but embedded within a broader framework of mutual trust-building efforts. Iran maintains that its nuclear program remains entirely peaceful in character.”   

• May 14: Another senior negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi, in testimony before the parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, stated, as reported by IRGC-aligned Javan:  

• • “Should the United States pursue a maximalist objective of total cessation of enrichment activities, the Islamic Republic sees no strategic rationale to continue negotiations.” 

• • Quoting a separate “informed source,” Javan reported: “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was adopted by Tehran as a provisional accord that ceased to align with Iran’s strategic interests following the U.S. withdrawal. The nuclear program has since experienced significant advancement thereby enhancing Iran’s bargaining power … Enrichment at 20% is perceived by Iranian decision makers as a strategic imperative to sustain a robust nuclear infrastructure. Consequently, Tehran has established this threshold as a nonnegotiable parameter in ongoing talks. Given that Witkoff has articulated a position opposing any enrichment in Iran, this will constitute a principal point of contention in the upcoming negotiation rounds.”  

• • Nevertheless, Javan, referencing “alternative analytical viewpoints,” suggested the possibility that “Iran, by agreeing to a temporary suspension of enrichment at this threshold in exchange for U.S. recognition of the principle of indigenous enrichment, might seek to incentivize Trump to endorse a revised accord.” Under such circumstances, an unnamed analyst quoted by Javan opined: “Trump could claim to have halted Iran’s enrichment program and frame this as a diplomatic success … Iran, in turn, could assert that its temporary compromise on the 20% enrichment level resulted in U.S. recognition of what is just.”  

• May 15: Admiral Ali Shamkhani, former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, stated in an interview with NBC that Iran was ready for a deal: 

• • “We can definitely have better relations with the United States.” Shamkhani added that Iran would be prepared to issue a binding commitment never to pursue nuclear weapons, relinquish its existing stockpile of highly enriched uranium, place its nuclear infrastructure under an inspection regime, and limit uranium enrichment strictly to levels consistent with civilian energy requirements. In return, Iran would seek full sanctions relief. He concluded by asserting that Tehran would be prepared to endorse such an accord “tonight.” 

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