How Does U.S. Power in the Middle East Today Compare to What It Was During the Previous Administration?
By most objective metrics, U.S. hard power (military), soft power (scientific, cultural, and humanitarian), and “sticky” power (economic) in the Middle East is largely unchanged from four or eight years ago. Washington is still the predominant outside force in the region, and, arguably, the single most influential player in the region. However, American leverage has...
U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis, third from left, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg walk to a meeting with deployed forces in Afghanistan, Sept. 27, 2017. (DoD photo by Air Force Staff Sgt. Jette Carr)
By most objective metrics, U.S. hard power (military), soft power (scientific, cultural, and humanitarian), and “sticky” power (economic) in the Middle East is largely unchanged from four or eight years ago. Washington is still the predominant outside force in the region, and, arguably, the single most influential player in the region.
However, American leverage has been declining in recent years due to a combination of factors: U.S. reticence to use military force; a concomitant rise of regional powers, such as Iran, and the return of Russia as a Middle Eastern player; and a perception that American leadership has been ineffective—whether in Iraq and Syria, in containing Iran, and even in mediating an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement.
The Trump administration has repaired frayed ties with traditional partners such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and adopted a tougher rhetorical stance against Iran’s destabilizing activities. But it has yet to do anything substantial to dispel the widespread impression that American power is gradually and irretrievably declining both globally and in the Middle East. Therefore, U.S. power today is, at best, comparable to that during the Obama administration, and arguably has continued a slow but steady deterioration that began after the invasion of Iraq.
President Trump has led the United States into an impossible dilemma in which resuming and intensifying the war presents one set of alarming consequences while ending it under current circumstances offers at least as many disasters for Washington.
The Trump administration has positioned the United States at a crossroads between a new regime of containment against Iran or a historic drawdown of U.S. influence in the Gulf and broader Middle East.
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi urged President Trump not to attack Iran, but now that the war is into its second month, leaving the current situation in place would be an unthinkable fiasco for them.
Though they were unsuccessful in preventing the current conflict, and, as expected, have been dragged into the U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran, Gulf Arab countries remain crucial to hopes for limiting the war and bringing it to a quick resolution.
