How Does U.S. Power in the Middle East Today Compare to What It Was During the Previous Administration?
By most objective metrics, U.S. hard power (military), soft power (scientific, cultural, and humanitarian), and “sticky” power (economic) in the Middle East is largely unchanged from four or eight years ago. Washington is still the predominant outside force in the region, and, arguably, the single most influential player in the region. However, American leverage has...
U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis, third from left, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg walk to a meeting with deployed forces in Afghanistan, Sept. 27, 2017. (DoD photo by Air Force Staff Sgt. Jette Carr)
By most objective metrics, U.S. hard power (military), soft power (scientific, cultural, and humanitarian), and “sticky” power (economic) in the Middle East is largely unchanged from four or eight years ago. Washington is still the predominant outside force in the region, and, arguably, the single most influential player in the region.
However, American leverage has been declining in recent years due to a combination of factors: U.S. reticence to use military force; a concomitant rise of regional powers, such as Iran, and the return of Russia as a Middle Eastern player; and a perception that American leadership has been ineffective—whether in Iraq and Syria, in containing Iran, and even in mediating an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement.
The Trump administration has repaired frayed ties with traditional partners such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and adopted a tougher rhetorical stance against Iran’s destabilizing activities. But it has yet to do anything substantial to dispel the widespread impression that American power is gradually and irretrievably declining both globally and in the Middle East. Therefore, U.S. power today is, at best, comparable to that during the Obama administration, and arguably has continued a slow but steady deterioration that began after the invasion of Iraq.
The Gulf Arab states have discovered that wealth without hard power, and alliance without political influence, leave them exposed to other countries' wars.
Iranian attacks on Omani ports and oil tankers are straining Oman’s long-standing “friend to all” regional foreign policy, but Muscat still has a part to play in achieving peace.
Though they were unsuccessful in preventing the current conflict, and, as expected, have been dragged into the U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran, Gulf Arab countries remain crucial to hopes for limiting the war and bringing it to a quick resolution.
After decades of tolerating Hezbollah’s warmaking independence, the current crisis has compelled Lebanese leaders to ban its military activities; this project will do much to determine the reach Iran can maintain in the Arab world.
Gulf Arab countries urged the United States not to strike Iran, but now that is happening, they are in danger of being sucked into a conflict they cannot control but that will likely reshape their present and future realities.
When quickly debunked rumors in the Israeli media that the UAE was seeking to manage postconflict Gaza were widely welcomed in Israel, it demonstrated both the trust the UAE has built among Israelis but also their lack of understanding of Emirati policies and interests.
On January 8, AGSI hosted a virtual roundtable with its leadership and scholars as they look ahead and assess trends likely to shape the Gulf region and U.S. foreign policy during the coming year.
