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Analysis

Iran’s Diplomatic Offensive Signifies Consensus in Tehran

The March 17 edition of the Iran Media Review explores commentary on Iranian diplomatic activity with Gulf Arab states.

Ali Alfoneh

9 min read

In the wake of the Beijing trilateral declaration that is paving the path of resumption for diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iranian officials are embarking upon a tour of the Gulf Arab states: Admiral Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, traveled to Abu Dhabi March 16 and Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf has also been invited to the United Arab Emirates. The UAE, which scaled back diplomatic relations in 2016, reinstated its ambassador to Tehran in August 2022. A parliamentary delegation from Iran also met with the speaker of the Bahraini Parliament in Manama March 13. While Kayhan newspaper credits the late Major General Qassim Suleimani for Iran’s diplomatic offensive, none of these initiatives would have been possible without consensus among the ruling elites of Iran and coordination among the government’s competing bureaucratic organizations.

  • March 15: Nour News, a mouthpiece of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, announced the March 16 visit of Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the Supreme National Security Council secretary, to Abu Dhabi.
  • March 15: According to Fars News, the Emirati ambassador to Iran had invited Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, speaker of the Iranian Parliament, to visit the UAE.
  • March 16: Nour News reported that the Intelligence Ministry’s external intelligence director and a deputy foreign minister were among Shamkhani’s delegation.
  • March 16: Tasnim News reported that Central Bank Governor Mohammad-Reza Farzin was also a member of Shamkhani’s delegation.
  • March 16: Foreign policy analyst Bahram Fallahi emphasized, in a conversation with Shargh Daily, that the recent diplomatic activities, such as the Beijing trilateral declaration, the parliamentary delegation’s meeting with the speaker of Bahrain’s Parliament, and renewed activities with the International Atomic Energy Agency, signify internal consensus among the power centers in Iran: “Looking at the deeper layers of the visits and the agreements, it is clear that the activities are beyond the authority of the Cabinet. The Parliament, the Supreme National Security Council, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and, in reality, the entire system is in motion.” Sajjad Seifzadeh, another analyst, said: “Arab countries of the Persian Gulf are engaged in a cautious, but serious, attempt to expand relations with Iran, even trade relations, which are deeply complicated due to the unprecedented level of the sanctions, in particular in the banking, financial, and monetary sectors.”
  • March 16: Etemad newspaper, quoting academic Davoud Gharayagh-Zandi, wrote: “Until recently, Iran was trying to counterbalance the pro-Western orientation of its Arab neighbors by orienting itself toward the East, but this policy was defeated … We thought improving Tehran’s relations with China and Russia would help us counterbalance Saudi Arabia and the regional sheikhdoms, but we saw that the Arabs, too, improved their relations with China and Russia. This proved to us that we could not preserve the regional balance of power depending on external powers.” Turning to more controversial subjects, Gharayagh-Zandi said, as quoted by Etemad: “In order to deepen relations with regional countries, Iran must be able to engage in a dialogue with them about two subjects. The first subject is Iran’s missile program. Regional states are concerned that Iran’s missile program is somehow related to Iran’s nuclear program, and here, Tehran must persuade the regional states otherwise … The next subject is Iran’s role in the region, such as in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Palestine, and even Iran’s policy toward Bahrain. These issues are decisive for the nature of Iran’s relations with regional countries. If Iran is incapable of reaching accord with the regional states concerning these subjects, this latest attempt at rapprochement will be defeated as previous attempts.”
  • March 16: Kayhan newspaper, quoting former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi, claimed the late Major General Qassim Suleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, “laid the foundations for the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement” in September 2019. Abdul-Mahdi said that when he was prime minister, Suleimani reached out to him and asked: “‘Is it possible for you to visit Saudi Arabia?’ I asked Suleimani, ‘Why?’ ‘In order to mediate between us and Saudi Arabia,’ Suleimani answered … Martyr Suleimani recommended establishing a national unity government to solve the crisis in Yemen, and he also expressed his support for improving Iraq’s relations with Saudi Arabia, securing shipping in the Persian Gulf, and solving common problems in Syria, Libya, and elsewhere … So, I contacted my Saudi brothers. When they asked me why I wanted to visit Saudi Arabia, I explained. They also asked who the Iranian party was requesting the travel. I said Suleimani, which they welcomed. In the morning of September 25, 2019, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who at the time served as the head of intelligence, the oil minister, and Muhammad al-Hashimi, my chief of staff, took part in the visit … We were welcomed by the king of Saudi Arabia, and in the late evening we also met the crown prince … Back then, Iran was accused of attacking the Aramco installations … the atmosphere was tense, and the crown prince spoke angrily. When he ended his speech, we asked: ‘Are you seeking war with Iran?’ He said ‘No.’ I said, if you don’t want war, you need to talk, so the situation does not get out of control. He said, ‘We tried a few times but did not succeed.’ I reminded him of how Rafsanjani,” referencing the former Iranian president ”and King Abdullah solved their problems and asked him to write his wishes, so we could convey them to the Iranians. I also said I was convinced that this would help start negotiations. Bin-Salman gave us a nine-page document concerning commitment to international law, good neighborly relations, fighting terrorism and radicalism, expanding relations with countries in the world, in particular neighboring countries, and the like … I conveyed the message to Suleimani, who was martyred by the cowardly United States administration at the time.”
  • March 16: In its coverage of the meeting between Shamkhani and Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, Nour News reported: “Explaining the external sources of crisis … Shamkhani said: ‘Reaching collective security based on indigenous resources can help end the existing crises. The existing problems are mainly due to foreign intervention and the mischief of the United States and the Zionist regime in the Persian Gulf region.”
  • March 16: Mashregh News, in its coverage of Shamkhani’s meeting with his Emirati counterpart, National Security Advisor Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nahyan, quoted Tahnoun as saying: “The agreements reached, along with further development of economic potential between the two countries in banking, transit, logistics, health, and investment, must be realized.”

The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.

Ali Alfoneh

Senior Fellow, AGSI

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