Jul 31, 2026
Javan Daily: “Iran’s War and Negotiation Plan”
The July 31 edition of the Iran Media Review analyzes an Iranian article arguing that Iran is following its own timetable and agenda on negotiations and escalation.
Iran’s attack on U.S. bases in Jordan reflects the regime’s growing willingness to accept – and even invite – greater risk. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Javan portrayed the strikes as evidence that Tehran no longer intends merely to mirror Washington’s escalation or restraint but will instead act according to its own timetable. The same risk-prone approach appears to guide diplomacy: Iran is negotiating through Oman while rejecting U.S. terms and insisting on its own proposal. Whether this represents a coherent strategy or dangerous overconfidence remains unclear, but Tehran appears determined to regain the initiative by making both war and diplomacy less predictable for Washington.
- July 30: An article on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Javan’s front page argued:
- “By attacking U.S. bases in Jordan despite the tacit cease-fire, Iran demonstrated that it has changed two things. First, Iran will no longer observe a cease-fire simply because the United States does. The party that once took others by surprise must now experience surprise itself. Second, Iran will no longer enter negotiations merely because the United States proposes talks. In other words, Iran is now following its own timetable and agenda. The attack in Jordan, coming after several days of tacit cease-fire, means that one can no longer expect Iran to begin attacking whenever the United States attacks and to stop whenever the United States stops. The game plan has changed – and become more complicated. A similar strategy is evident in the negotiations. Iran is currently negotiating amid war, despite the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb – but not with the United States. Iran has negotiated with the Omanis, rejected several of their proposals, and placed its own nonnegotiable proposal on the table. This, too, represents a new Iranian strategy and game plan. All of this constitutes ‘Iran’s strategy for war and negotiations.’”
The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.