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Analysis

Iran Signals Interest in Reviving Hormuz Deal While Warning of Psychological Warfare

The August 28 edition of the Iran Media Review examines statements by Iranian officials suggesting openness to restarting negotiation with the United States and concern about domestic discontent.

Ali Alfoneh

6 min read

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Qalibaf, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps spokesman Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi have each made public statements regarding Iran’s preconditions for resuming negotiations with the United States and “reopening the Strait of Hormuz.” Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei is now conveying the same message: Iran is interested in reviving the memorandum of understanding. Meanwhile, warnings issued by the IRGC Intelligence Organization to the Iranian public betray the regime’s concerns about Israeli and U.S. psychological operations, even as it seeks to project strength.

  • August 27: In an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei commented on Iran’s conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, as reported by the reformist Entekhab News Agency:
    • “Reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is conditioned upon the United States meeting Iran’s demands … Foremost among these conditions is an end to the wars in West Asia, particularly in Lebanon and Gaza … Iran has prepared a list of its conditions to be conveyed to the Americans. For the time being, it has authorized vessels to use a designated temporary passage through the middle of the strait, on the condition that future navigation through it be governed by a memorandum of understanding with Washington.”
  • August 27: In a statement released by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Mashregh News Agency, the IRGC Intelligence Organization declared:
    • “Closer monitoring of political, economic, and social threats – as well as military activities – over the past 60 days indicates that, recognizing its own limitations and the Islamic Revolution’s advantages, the enemy is attempting to pursue the aforementioned plan by relying more heavily on cognitive- and intelligence-warfare tools along the following lines:
      1. Portraying the Strait of Hormuz as ineffective in safeguarding the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
      2. Preventing the Islamic Republic of Iran from engaging in another regional war.
      3. Portraying the capabilities of the Axis of Resistance in the region as limited.
      4. Imposing a naval blockade.
      5. Eroding the ‘sacred unity,’ promoting discontent and polarization, and exaggerating disagreements.
      6. Exaggerating and exploiting certain domestic weaknesses, shortages, and constraints affecting the governance of the country.
      7. Inciting the public to take their grievances to the streets.
    • “Therefore, at this juncture, the center of gravity of this plan is its focus on ‘disrupting stability and weakening the Iranian people’s national resilience’ by launching cognitive warfare and generating fear and uncertainty. This is a development whose consequences the organization had previously warned about in its three statements issued during the attempted coup” of December 22, 2025 to January 20, 2026.

The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.

Ali Alfoneh

Senior Fellow, AGSI

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