As Iranian-Saudi Rivalry Eases, Regional Diplomacy Accelerates

Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan’s June 17 visit to Tehran, the first by a senior Saudi official since 2016, represents the centerpiece of a much broader range of diplomatic activity and related de-escalation efforts in the Gulf since late spring. Faisal bin Farhan met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and, separately, President Ebrahim Raisi. Afterward, Amir-Abdollahian stressed in public remarks the importance of increasing trade and investment, while Faisal bin Farhan highlighted maritime security, respect for the principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of neighbors, and reducing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Tehran visit came just weeks after the Iranians reopened their embassy in Riyadh and their consulate in Jeddah. They have since appointed Alireza Enayati as ambassador. The Saudis reportedly have a team in Tehran, working out of a hotel, to prepare for the reopening of their embassy.

The Faisal bin Farhan visit to Tehran came one week after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s June 8-10 visit to Riyadh, widely seen as part of a sustained U.S. effort to strengthen a challenged relationship with the Saudis. The two sides highlighted their strong security partnership and close cooperation on regional issues ranging from counterterrorism to clean energy.

Broader, Frenetic Round of Diplomatic Activity

Faisal bin Farhan’s Tehran visit also points to a broader, near frenetic round of diplomatic activity in the Gulf in recent days. These moves signal an emphasis – by Gulf Arab countries – on de-escalation and extrication from conflict, building trade relations, and ensuring freedom of movement for partnership and alliance while avoiding getting ensnared in zero-sum great power competition. Gulf leaders justify this approach based on their position in an increasingly multipolar world in which great powers vie for influence, and regional and middle powers must strategically diversify. Saudi Minister of Investment Khaled al-Falih said recently, “the kingdom is a significant part of this multipolar world that has emerged. And we’re going to play our part.” Meanwhile, Iran’s embrace of the diplomatic whirlwind makes clear its vigorous efforts to break out of regional isolation, thwart the impact of choking U.S. and European sanctions, and play to its advantage its well-stocked, proxy-fueled resources for leverage and regional influence. With several recent incidents of the Iranian navy seizing oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, it seems clear the Iranians have only partially bought into the de-escalation emphasis in the Gulf; they will likely continue to engage in asymmetric incidents to increase their leverage on the diplomatic front and try to shape the decision-making calculus in Gulf Arab states.

Meanwhile the dizzying rounds of diplomatic musical chairs and statecraft in the region play on.

In mid-June, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates restored ties and reopened their respective embassies, developments presaged by Emirati National Security Advisor Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nahyan’s March visit to Doha. The Emirati Foreign Ministry laid emphasis on the 2021 Al Ula agreement that ended the boycott of Qatar as a key factor in the move to restore relations. Surprisingly, given the progress the Emiratis and Qataris had made in the past several months and the stubborn bilateral issues that have long colored Bahraini-Qatari relations, Doha and Manama sealed the deal to restore diplomatic ties three months earlier, in mid-April. The two neighbors have long disputed their maritime border and Manama has fumed at Qatar’s relatively warm ties with Iran, which Bahrain has long accused of conducting destabilization efforts in the country.

Iran-Focused Activity at the Center

Iran for its part has also been active on the diplomatic and statecraft circuit. Amir-Abdollahian made a regional tour in June, wrapping up in Abu Dhabi with a meeting with Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, after making the rounds in Doha, Muscat, and Kuwait. The Iranian foreign minister extended an invitation from Raisi for Mohammed bin Zayed to visit Tehran, which Amir-Abdollahian similarly did with the other Gulf leaders.

One month earlier, according to media accounts and Iranian statements, Iran and the United States had been holding indirect talks in Muscat, brokered by Omani officials. National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk represented the United States, while nuclear negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani spoke for the Iranians. The talks reportedly focused on Iran’s nuclear program, freeing imprisoned Americans, and the release of frozen Iranian funds. Media accounts citing Israeli sources reported that the United States has been seeking some type of interim or informal agreement with Iran on its nuclear program. The effort has been viewed as part of a larger U.S. effort “to ease tensions and reduce the risk of a military confrontation” with Iran.

Iran also continues its diplomatic effort with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran and the IAEA have reportedly moved toward resolving questions about the Marivan site where inspectors previously discovered undeclared nuclear material. The IAEA’s director general, Rafael Mariano Grossi, obtained Iranian pledges to cooperate with its probe during a March visit to Tehran.

Turkey, China, and Russia Poised to Engage

Not to be left out, major regional player Turkey appears poised for another round of high-level diplomacy, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expected to return soon to the Gulf. The goal is to attract investment and other financial resources Turkey hasn’t been as readily able to tap into from the West. However, recent reports that Turkey has acquiesced to Sweden’s joining NATO may presage an increase in such financial incentives from the West. Erdogan is expected to visit the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in the coming days. His expected UAE visit was telegraphed in June when his minister of finance, Mehmet Simsek, visited Abu Dhabi to discuss economic cooperation. The likely visit to Abu Dhabi is expected to build on Erdogan’s meeting with Mohammed bin Zayed in Istanbul in June. In March, the two countries signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, emphasizing strategic cooperation in addition to economic partnership. The 2021-22 Erdogan visits to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh (reciprocated by the Emirati and Saudi leaders) were bellwethers in the early Gulf turn toward diplomatic maneuver and extrication from conflict that has fundamentally transformed the regional landscape.

The Russians and Chinese have also been visible in this most recent round of diplomatic activity and statecraft. On the energy front, the Russians and Saudis recently announced an agreement to maintain their respective voluntary cuts in oil production, in overall support of efforts by the OPEC+ alliance of OPEC and non-OPEC producers and an indication of the pivotal role Russia has built for itself in the Gulf since its 2015 intervention in Syria. On the more routine diplomatic front, Russia and Gulf Cooperation Council countries met July 10 in Moscow for the sixth joint ministerial meeting of strategic dialogue. In mid-June, the Saudis hosted the Arab-China Business Conference, a potent reminder of the outsized, ascendant role China plays in economic diplomacy and business in the Gulf. It also serves as an indirect reminder of the significant diplomatic role China played in brokering the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement that has fueled much of the surrounding diplomatic activity.

The foundation for this frenetic diplomatic activity is the rising confidence of Gulf leaders, secure in the economics of relatively high oil prices over a sustained period and intently aware that the world is coming to them. They sense significant leverage to be deployed and a fractured but stable geopolitical landscape that allows them a heightened ability to maneuver, hedge, and insist. Nothing lasts forever, but for now, it remains the Gulf moment, both in the broader Middle East and globally; the recent turbocharged diplomatic activity in the region is one crucial indicator of a region brimming with confidence and embracing and shaping possibilities for the future. That confidence will help shape the difficult transitions these countries are well into, as they seek to retool their domestic economies, move away from reliance on hydrocarbons, and implement ambitious economic visions for the coming decade.

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