Trump’s MAGA Bid Helps the Gulf Become More Global

The outcome of President Donald J. Trump’s tour of the Gulf Arab states serves as an opportunity to test the proposition described in November 2024 by these authors for a “creative policy centered on peace, regional stability, and cooperation.” While the signed agreements during the tour appear largely transactional, fulfilling Trump’s MAGA agenda, they were also strategic in several ways. They addressed the three main requirements for win-win arrangements during Trump’s second term and further catapulted the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to the center of a multialigned and multinetworked global affairs.

First, Trump’s visit sealed the recent debate about what currently drives global affairs, at least in the region – geoeconomics rather than geopolitics. Despite the uncertainty about the exact number, the announced deals were impressive in scope. In the current global economic environment, not many countries or regions can commit or invest as much as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates did in May. Currently possessing about 40% of global sovereign wealth funds’ assets gives the GCC countries the financial bandwidth to seal their place as apex middle powers with a greater degree of global impact than earlier and in the geopolitical arena as well. An even more indicative sign that geopolitics was not the operating principle of the White House was the absence of the U.S. president’s traditional stopover in Israel during a visit to the Middle East.

Second, the economic focus suggests that Washington may have finally learned a lesson from the “Asian template.” Given the terms on which Gulf-Asia ties have grown over the last 25 years – focusing on economic partnership rather than politics, human rights, and security considerations – Trump’s remarks at the Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum that Saudi Arabia had “achieved a modern miracle the Arabian way” acknowledged the United States’ past error of trying to dictate the region’s evolution.

This new economic-centered approach may help marginally reduce the massive gap between Gulf-Asia and Gulf-U.S. trade volumes – about $450 billion and $94 billion, respectively, in 2023. The United States’ recalibrated approach of not seeing itself as the pedestal of ideology, but as a partner in prosperity, may extend beyond the GCC subregion.

Third, the “art of the deal” also underlined the primacy of technology and its intersection with international relations. Trump’s visit had relatively less to do with traditional energy issues and more to do with building a new partnership for economic diversification and a digitalized world order. While this is encouraging for the region’s economic diversification agenda and the bid to stay ahead in a competitive digital age, it also dilutes the clarity of the 1980 Carter Doctrine of “oil for security.”

While there were plenty of arms deals, they were more about modernization of weapon systems through tech inducements to counter “new” enemies in the nontraditional security domain – nonstate actors, piracy, etc. – and less about traditional security guarantees against state rivals. The deals pertain to airpower advancement and space capabilities, air and missile defense, maritime and coastal security; border security and land force modernization; and information and communication systems upgrades, among others. This focus reinforces Washington’s efforts to fashion the United States as an offshore and collaborative security provider. Such an approach also suggests a change in the way Washington perceives “power” projection – from direct deterrence to facilitation, using technology.

Fourth, contrary to past U.S. presidential visits to the Middle East, Trump clearly did not put Israel at the center of his trip. Not only did he skip Israel, but he also made several policy statements that aligned more with the GCC countries than with its traditional regional partner, especially on Syria and Iran. This could be construed as an acknowledgement that the United States is starting to deal with the region as a partner with important perspectives rather than as countries that should follow Washington’s script.

The U.S. position on Iran constitutes a reversal of its isolation strategy of the past 30 years. Its current approach is closer to the de-escalation tactics of the GCC countries, focused on attenuating the ideological and interventionist aspects of Iranian systems through investment in the economy and diplomacy rather than on regime change.

Fifth, the region’s interests are tied with the United States through I2U2 (along with India, Israel, and the UAE) and IMEC (the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), which were built upon the principles of transregional cooperation. The major challenge facing initiatives that seek to bridge the Global South and Global North is the ongoing war in Gaza. In a world shifting from ideological alliances to pragmatic partnerships, Israel will not be able to secure steadfast allies without contributing to broader regional stability. Taking a page from Trump’s playbook, Israel should understand that its security is ultimately tied to the strength of its regional partnerships and that lasting stability can only be achieved if such stability is the leading shared priority.

But the extent to which the deals reached during Trump’s visit will materialize in the medium and long terms depends on what happens in the U.S. domestic scenario – the tariff war, economic growth, congressional approvals for policy changes, and policy continuity and consistency among successive administrations, etc. The U.S. economic competition with China and international oil prices are equally important considerations.

It is such realities of the new interconnected world that are making the GCC countries important partners of the United States. The same realities also make China an indispensable partner of the region. GCC countries’ ability to avoid binary choices and drop the zero-sum equation in favor of win-win dynamics will be the main calculus for future partnerships. Asia, Africa, and South America will also continue to be important players in an interconnected, supply-chain-driven world, which the United States should invest in more intently to accrue benefits.

While the Gulf is important, China is likely to be the apex in the MAGA arrangement of global priorities. Looking ahead, Washington should lean in on competitiveness over competition. It is the United States’ competitiveness that convinced Emirati companies to invest trillions in the U.S. artificial intelligence industry. Conversely, forcing the UAE to take sides in the grand competition with China over 5G servers did not help the United States.

Trump’s visit to the region has highlighted how the United States can craft “a creative policy centered on peace, regional stability, and cooperation.” This policy may not stop with the Middle East or with MAGA. It holds the potential to redefine America’s global role in the 21st century, shifting from the legacy of the traditional “physics” of geopolitics, which depends on military power, political polarity, and geographical presence, to something closer to “quantum politics,” which reflects higher dependence on the dynamics of economic and digital connectivity over political affinity. The United States is finally showing that it is ready to use the toolbox of the 21st century rather than that of the 19th century.

The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.