The IRGC Backs Ali Larijani the Pragmatist

In the latest example of external pressure fostering intraelite cohesion, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ primary media outlet praised President Masoud Pezeshkian’s August 5 appointment of Ali Larijani as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Larijani’s return to the upper echelons of power marks a further step in the consolidation of Iran’s emerging collective leadership, as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei remains in hiding, fearing an Israeli assassination attempt. 

• August 6: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Javan praised President Masoud Pezeshkian’s appointment of Ali Larijani as Supreme National Security Council secretary, suggesting that it: 

• •  “signifies the return of an experienced and effective figure to the forefront of strategic national security decision making. Rather than being a purely political move, it reflects the regime’s inclination to prioritize expertise in times of crisis … It also demonstrates the leadership’s need for an individual who not only enjoys relative acceptability across the country’s political factions but is also capable of managing complex regional and international developments … Larijani’s recent visit to Russia likely signals his new role in handling high-level relations with major powers, such as Russia and China. He is among the few who can strike a balance in Iran’s international relations without succumbing to either emotionalism or excessive conservatism … Given his current role as a political advisor to the leader, as well as his prior experience in Parliament, diplomacy, and national security, Larijani is expected to act as a mediator and balancer across key domains of macrolevel decision making, including the military establishment, the Cabinet, and even political currents … Thanks to his extensive networks at home and abroad and his systemic approach to policymaking, he is well-positioned to guide sensitive issues, such as regional diplomacy, revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or an alternative to it, relations with Russia, China, and the emerging powers, and domestic and regional security challenges.”  

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