The Quds Force Under Qaani

Politicians and pundits in Washington have debated the efficacy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, the expeditionary wing of Iran’s armed forces, ever since the self-effacing Brigadier General Ismail Qaani replaced the charismatic Major General Qassim Suleimani, who was killed January 3, 2020, as Quds Force commander. While supporters of Suleimani’s assassination claim the Quds Force has been in decline under Qaani’s leadership, opponents of the assassination argue the highly institutionalized Quds Force never depended on a single leader. It is no surprise that Kayhan Daily agrees with the latter, but in truth, it is difficult to compare the Quds Force under Suleimani with the Quds Force under Qaani.

Under Suleimani, the Quds Force stepped out of the shadows, particularly following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and mobilized non-Iranian Shia forces in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Under Qaani, the Quds Force is back in the shadows. Under Suleimani, the Quds Force and Iran’s rivals and their preferred proxies engaged in a struggle to fill the regional power vacuum in the wake of the invasion of Iraq and the Arab Spring uprisings. Under Qaani, Iran consolidated its regional position while gradually reaching an understanding with its rivals. Iraq is the one theater where the Quds Force’s performance is visibly weakened, but this is arguably due more to the death of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces (an umbrella of Iraqi militias that contains pro-Iranian forces), in the U.S. strike on Suleimani.

• May 2: Under the headline “Israel’s Fear of the Growing Prowess of Commander Qaani,” Middle East expert Saad-Allah Zarei wrote in Kayhan: “Three years ago, high-ranking American officials, in the framework of their intelligence cooperation with the Zionist regime, began a project to legitimize the assassination of the martyred commander Haj Qassim Suleimani.” Zarei quoted Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who according to Kayhan’s translation of an unspecified report, allegedly argued: “There is no replacement for Qassim Suleimani … and Iran’s strategy in Iraq will collapse.” Turning to more recent commentary from Washington, Zarei continued: “A few days ago, David Petraeus, who was the commander of U.S. Central Command when the United States assassinated Commander Suleimani, overtly said in an interview: ‘The U.S. assassination of Commander Suleimani was not successful and has not managed to slow Iran’s regional activities.’” In fact, Petraeus’ tenure as CENTCOM commander ended in 2011. Zarei concluded by declaring that, under Qaani, “the path of the martyred Commander Suleimani is not just continuing but has become more forceful … ‘Resistance’ paved the path of Iran into global power equations … and it has been a successful path … Therefore, ‘resistance’ must continue.”

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