Tehran Gloats and Worries

As the results of the U.S. midterm elections emerged on November 4, Iranian officials rushed to take credit for the Republican defeat, presenting it as Americans’ verdict on the Iran war. Yet the triumphalism masks unease: President Donald J. Trump may seek to restore his authority by striking Iran again.

• November 4: A statement was issued in the name of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei and carried by Iranian media, including Tabnak News Agency, which is close to Supreme National Security Council Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei, before the results of the U.S. midterm elections became public:
  • “Now the scene of the Persian Gulf, especially the Strait of Hormuz, has proved the myth of America’s invincibility false. It also shows the weakness and abjectness of governments that rely on any force other than their own nation and the faithlessness and impotence of the great powers in defending their puppet governments. Iran’s exercise of control over the Strait of Hormuz and the destruction of U.S. military bases in the countries of the region was a reaction to America’s aggression and crimes in the third imposed war … ‘indeed, falsehood is ever bound to perish.’”
• November 4: Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Qalibaf posted on X:
  • “Conscience or the cost of living, Americans said NO TO WAR, and we endorse this message. If the US govt betrays their public will to serve international paymasters and blackmailers, it will learn our NO comes with a Nightmare.”
• November 4: Rezaei was quoted by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Mashregh News Agency:
  • “The Iranian nation inflicted a strategic defeat on Trump on the battlefield and in the Hormuz region, and a political defeat in Washington … Americans were forced to pay the cost of Trump’s war … Whoever picks a fight with Iran will pay the price for it, whether on the battlefield or on their own doorstep.”
• November 5: SNSC mouthpiece Nour News Agency published an article about scenarios for President Donald J. Trump’s response to electoral defeat, the third of which the author suggested was most likely:
  • “First, policy review and adjustment. Trump may regard the electoral defeat as a sign that a change of course is necessary: He may reduce the intensity of military engagement, make efforts to end the war, and, in domestic politics, seek agreements with the Democrats. Such a course could help reduce the administration’s political and economic costs, although it would require accepting some constraints and changing previous positions.”
  • “Second, continuation of the status quo accompanied by periodic escalations of tension. In this scenario, Trump refuses to accept strategic defeat but at the same time also avoids entering a wider war. Economic pressure, military threats, limited operations, and intermittent negotiations may continue. This situation could lead to continued uncertainty in the region and an increased risk of unintended clashes.”
  • “Third, escalation of military confrontation to restore political authority. This is the very scenario Clinton has warned about. In this situation, the pressure resulting from political defeat and the curtailment of the administration’s power may be accompanied by a decision to increase military strikes or expand the scope of the conflict. In terms of domestic political calculations, such a decision could be seen as an attempt to change the public mood and regain the initiative; but its consequences may go far beyond the initial calculations. A wider conflict with Iran could affect the security of the region, energy markets, U.S. military forces, and the stability of the global economy.”

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