Cornered at Home and Abroad, the Regime Turns to the Pragmatists

Facing the dual threats of a protracted low-intensity conflict with Israel and the potential for renewed anti-regime protests driven by electricity outages, water shortages, and rising prices, Iran is increasingly turning to pragmatists. For example, Ali Larijani, former Supreme National Security Council secretary, is likely to replace the largely ineffectual Brigadier General Ali Akbar Ahmadian. Larijani’s political fortunes reached a nadir after his disqualification by the Guardian Council from competing in the 2024 presidential election, but he has been experiencing a steady political resurgence over the past year. In mid-November 2024, he visited Damascus and Beirut as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s personal envoy, and on July 20, he met Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in an unannounced visit.

While the regime relied on Larijani’s statesmanship to coordinate national security and foreign policy strategies across government agencies and on President Masoud Pezeshkian, seen as a man of the people, to pacify a restive public, it now risks undercutting this approach by reviving the 1980s-era Defense Council to manage the long-term risk of conflict with Israel. Should the Defense Council be led by a powerful figure outside Larijani’s control, it may evolve into a parallel institution with overlapping responsibilities, complicating strategic decision making and undermining interagency coordination.

• July 30: On X, Supreme National Security Council mouthpiece Nour News Agency predicted an increased likelihood of “imminent change at the highest levels of certain high-level security institutions.”
• July 30: In an interview with centrist Khabar Online, Mansur Haqiqatpur, a political activist affiliated with Ali Larijani, “did not dismiss rumors of Larijani’s appointment” as secretary of the SNSC.
• August 1: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Fars News Agency, citing “informed sources,” reported on upcoming structural changes within the SNSC and the establishment of a “Defense Council” – a new body with “strategic missions in the realm of defense policy,” the structure of which will soon be finalized. Fars News further reported that SNSC Secretary General Ali Akbar Ahmadian will soon be tasked with “directing certain special strategic projects” and will be replaced by Larijani.
• August 1: Gholam-Ali Jafarzadeh Imen-Abadi, a former parliamentarian close to Larijani, confirmed the rumors of Larijani’s appointment to the SNSC in an interview with Eqtesad News and called for genuine changes:
  • “We can’t continue as in the past … It is necessary to revise the process of utilizing the country’s elites, those who have been unjustly sidelined and confined to their homes … The changes must be comprehensive and profound across all dimensions and sectors. Superficial changes are not sufficient. If the changes are not deep rooted, they do not constitute real change.”
• August 2: In an analysis of Larijani’s appointment published by reformist Ham-Mihan, Hamid-Reza Jalaeipour of Tehran University, a reformist theoretician, argued:
  • “It appears the Islamic Republic and the centrists are pursuing a policy of neither war nor surrender … The success of this approach depends on the public reaction to existing hardships, such as power outages, water shortages, and rising prices. While public dissatisfaction remains, the centrists’ avoidance of war lowers the likelihood of a large-scale and effective insurrection against the regime … Separately, the continuation of proxy wars and targeted assassinations is the most likely scenario the centrists will confront – challenging to manage but still within the realm of possibility.”
• August 2: A commentary written by centrist Iranian Labour News Agency’s editorial board and published by Iranian Labour News Agency praising the likely return of Larijani to the SNSC also indirectly called for the removal of hard-line Saeed Jalili as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s representative to the council:
  • “In recent years, the prominent presence of hard-line factions in the SNSC has not only hindered flexible decision making in foreign policy but, according to many political figures, has also at times led to increased pressure on elites and the elimination of civil mechanisms when managing domestic crises … Accordingly, the question facing public opinion, particularly among political elites, is this: If Larijani is to play a central role, what will happen to the radical domestic currents, including the faction close to Saeed Jalili? Is this redesign merely a change of faces, or does it signify a revision of the country’s security-centered political approach?”
• August 2: IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency provided insights into the legal framework and composition of the newly established Defense Council:
  • “Article 176 of the constitution explicitly states that the Supreme National Security Council, in accordance with its duties, shall form subsidiary councils, such as the Defense Council and the National Security Council. The head of each subsidiary council shall be the president or one of the members of the Supreme National Security Council, appointed by the president. The scope of authority and duties of the subsidiary councils shall be determined by law, and their structure must be approved by the Supreme Council.”
  • “Based on this constitutional article, the structure of the Defense Council was approved a few days ago. According to this structure, the president will chair the council, and it is highly likely that a member of the country’s armed forces will be appointed by the president as the council’s secretary.”
  • “According to some reports, the Defense Council’s members will include the heads of the three branches of government, two representatives of the supreme leader to the Supreme National Security Council, the minister of intelligence, the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, the commander-in-chief of the IRGC, the commander-in-chief of the army, and the commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.”
• August 2: In an analysis published by centrist Khabar Online, Niloufar Molaei warned that the Defense Council could potentially function as a parallel institution with overlapping responsibilities to the SNSC, complicating decision making and undermining coordination.

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