While regional dynamics support de-escalation between Bahrain and Iran, a host of obstacles and a potent history of bilateral grievances are likely to ensure anemic relations.
King of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, May 23. (YURI KOCHETKOV/Pool via REUTERS)
Bahrain and Iran agreed June 23 to take steps aimed at restoring bilateral diplomatic ties. The tentatively worded statement, issued jointly by both countries’ foreign ministries, came after Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani met with his counterpart, acting Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani, in Tehran on the margins of the Asian Cooperative Dialogue summit. It was Zayani’s second visit to Tehran within a month. Media accounts the following day reported the two sides had agreed to start talks also focused on the release of Iranian funds frozen in Bahrain since the kingdom cut relations in 2016, following attacks on Saudi diplomatic posts in Iran after the Saudi execution of opposition Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr on terrorism charges. The diplomatic initiative followed Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa’s May 23 statement in Moscow, following his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, insisting he saw no reason to delay normalizing relations with Iran and minimizing any previous bilateral irritations. A flurry of quasi-private messages and public statements by the two sides previewed the king’s bold Moscow statement.
Supportive Regional and Domestic Contexts
The move by Bahrain follows a similar, higher profile initiative by Saudi Arabia, brokered by China, to restore relations with Iran in 2023 and parallel moves the previous year by the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait to upgrade relations with Iran and send ambassadors back to Tehran.
Other recent developments in Bahrain and the broader Gulf provided supportive domestic and regional contexts for this latest diplomatic reshuffle. In mid-June, Bahrain and Qatar exchanged ambassadors for the first time since the Saudi-led boycott of Qatar seven years earlier, providing another recent indication of the regional move to de-escalation and diplomatic maneuver and away from confrontation. In April, King Hamad pardoned more than 1,500 prisoners, the great majority convicted of crimes connected with Arab Spring unrest, an indication the country felt confident enough domestically to move past this issue and the Tehran-related resentments it has provoked in Manama. Bahrain long insisted Iran had helped instigate the unrest that prompted the sustained crackdown and led to those long-term detentions. In the decade and a half since the unrest, Manama also accused Tehran publicly of training and equipping violent Bahraini groups intent on destabilizing the country and trying to overthrow the monarchy, charges validated by U.S. intelligence.
Key Challenges Likely to Limit Scope of Relations With Iran
Despite domestic and regional dynamics reinforcing the Bahraini-Iranian move to restore diplomatic relations, there are a number of obstacles that, taken together, may challenge that trajectory and keep progress relatively restrained. Bahrain’s normalized relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords will continue to be viewed by Tehran with significant suspicion and concern. Iran has generally adopted a harsher line toward Bahrain than the UAE for what it views as this diplomatic heresy, perhaps explained by vulnerabilities in Bahrain and opportunities in the UAE Iran has traditionally sought to exploit. In addition, the Gaza war has weakened some of these supportive dynamics in the region, particularly related to de-escalation. Emirati analyst and senior government advisor Anwar Gargash spelled out such concerns regarding the potential impact of the Gaza conflict on trends favoring de-escalation and reliance on diplomacy.
On the bilateral side, challenges also abound. Bahrain and Iran represent profoundly different types of regimes, one a small, low-key status quo power and the other a brash, if often bumbling, revisionist power intent on undermining the long-standing U.S.-led international order and the security architecture the United States has established in the Gulf. Bahrain helps underpin that architecture by hosting the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. Iran sees itself, on the other hand, as leader of the so-called axis of resistance and of military proxies intent on challenging this regional order and security architecture. Iran also has a history of pursuing diplomatic relations in the region while simultaneously engaging in acts of intimidation. The intimidation, usually relying on proxy forces or otherwise deniable behavior, seeks to compel hedging away from the United States and undercut its security assurances.
There is also no golden age of previous relations the two countries can easily revert back to. A long history of irredentist tendencies in Iran, specifically focused on Bahrain, with ferocious eruptions in Tehran’s regime-controlled media as recently as 2022 and 2023, also signals that correct, but not particularly warm relations, are expected. In these regime-orchestrated eruptions, Iranian analysts and officials insisted Bahrain was an integral part of Iran, representing the country’s 14th province. While such discourse is likely to be muzzled in the coming period, its damaging echoes will continue to reverberate. Even trade statistics before relations were ruptured point to limited mutual economic benefits and activity, despite the close proximity of the two countries.
Sources of Bahraini Confidence Enabling the Move
Given these challenges and the relatively limited bilateral relations when the two countries maintained diplomatic ties, Iran-Bahrain relations are unlikely to develop fully. But taking this initiative now makes clear that Bahrain wants to follow the path of diplomatic maneuver of its two most important Gulf allies – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – despite the challenges, weighing the tangible benefits.
It is also an indication of confidence. Bahrain has a recently signed security agreement with the United States and a stable leadership in place for the future, with heir-apparent Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa empowered as prime minister. So, the Bahrainis are signaling to the Iranians they are confident and ready for ordinary diplomatic relations and willing to modestly invest in, and assume the risks of, such a relationship. While this is unlikely to fundamentally alter the basic contours of a perennially difficult relationship, it will likely normalize the situation and return it to a manageable status quo. And it allows Bahrain, as a classic small power, to play to its strengths, reinforcing dominant trends in the region established and tested by its more senior Gulf partners focused on de-escalation, diplomatic maneuver, normalization, and sought-after U.S. security guarantees. Bahrain also understands diplomatic relations are a highway, not a dead end; if the island kingdom is confronted in the future with unexpected developments – whether a change in the stance of the United States and Manama’s Gulf partners toward Iran or an altered security environment – Bahrain knows how to take the off-ramp, as it has done before.
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