An Iranian Account of the Islamabad Talks

The first Iranian account of recent negotiations between the United States and Iran in Islamabad, Pakistan, highlights a familiar feature from previous rounds of negotiations: While the Iranian team consisted of subject-matter experts, the U.S. side lacked command of the issues at hand. Nevertheless, despite the talks ending without an agreement, the direct meeting between Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Qalibaf and Vice President JD Vance is itself progress.

• April 13: In a video released on center-right Farhikhtegan’s Youtube channel, editor Mohammad-Amin Imanjani, who was part of the Iranian delegation to the Islamabad negotiations between the United States and Iran, provided his account of the talks:
  • “The Iranian delegation was composed of technical and subject-matter experts … the participants were not only dedicated and committed but also capable and authorized by the highest authorities. The counterpart was the vice president and two individuals previously involved in negotiations … who perhaps did not have command of the subject matter. This was also one of the problems during previous rounds of negotiations. U.S. representatives did not have command of the subject matter while the Iranian team did. They lacked the necessary will or authorization as was apparent in media reports that they were in contact with the U.S. president 10 to 11 times during the negotiations. This stood in contrast to the Iranian team … In the Iranian delegation, there were two former chief negotiators.”
  • “We had the sense that the U.S. team was primarily interested in assessing the Iranian side. We were in a wartime condition, and the threats issued up to the beginning of the talks not only conveyed a willingness to strike our fundamental infrastructure but also the eradication of Iranian civilization … The U.S. team entered the negotiations with maximalist demands to assess the Iranian response to determine how much it was willing to concede … The Iranian team, on the other hand, sought to safeguard its achievements. Unlike past negotiations, we did not enter the talks from a position of weakness … Despite the harm we had suffered … we were managing the Strait of Hormuz … But the meeting between the vice president and the head of the legislative branch provided a special opportunity … for the viewpoints of the leadership on both sides to move closer to one another.”
  • “The negotiations were characterized by exchanges of written proposals … The opportunity arose for the ruling authorities of both countries to better understand each other without intermediaries … In previous rounds of negotiations, Mr. Witkoff and Mr. Kushner … with real estate backgrounds, lacked the skills to convey Iran’s messages to U.S. leadership … but now, there was a real opportunity for face-to-face communication” between Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Qalibaf and Vice President JD Vance.
  • “The Iranian delegation was in direct contact with Lebanese Hezbollah during the negotiations … the Iranian team was also in contact with the ‘ground’ inside Iran … for example regarding the proximity of the U.S. Navy to Iran, which could have disrupted the negotiations … Lebanon was a red line for the Islamic Republic. Hezbollah was important, and Iran had plans for it.”

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