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Analysis

Hoping for Sanctions Relief, Iran is Preparing for the Worst-Case Scenario 

The January 28 edition of the Iran Media Review highlights remarks by Iran’s deputy foreign minister for political affairs regarding nuclear negotiations with the United States.  

Ali Alfoneh

5 min read

Iranian leaders hope for a negotiated solution to the crisis over Tehran’s nuclear program. But they are preparing for the worst-case scenario should Iran fail to reach an agreement with the United States, Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for political affairs, stated in an interview with the centrist Iranian Students’ News Agency. 

  • January 27: Majid Takht-Ravanchi, deputy foreign minister for political affairs, spoke to the Iranian Students’ News Agency about negotiations with the United States: 
    • “In his first term in office, Mr. Trump pursued the ‘maximum pressure campaign’ against Iran. This policy, however, was a strategic failure, and we are not the only ones saying this … For the time being, Trump’s policy toward Iran remains indeterminate, and we must await clarification on this front. At first, Trump assumed he could coerce Iran to change course, through the maximum pressure campaign and by withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but this did not materialize.” 
    • “When asked about the presence of “anti-Iran individuals in Mr. Trump’s administration,” Takht-Ravanchi remarked: “They may be, but it is premature to draw conclusions. We may have our hypotheses, but it is too early to make definitive judgments. Moreover, we are not operating passively, devoid of strategic planning on how to address these challenges … We are not waiting for Trump to dictate his policy toward Iran. However, certain individuals who exhibited radical rhetoric during the campaign may act with more pragmatism when burdened with executive responsibility. Therefore, we must exercise patience, but at the same time, we must prepare for the worst-case scenario.” 
    • In response to a question regarding Iran’s purported “weakened position” in the Middle East following Israel’s actions against Lebanese Hezbollah and the collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Takht-Ravanchi asserted: “I reject the claim that Iran has been weakened. There are actors who propagate such narratives in light of shifting regional dynamics, but such claims are incorrect. Furthermore, regional developments are distinct from the nuclear dossier and Iran’s diplomatic engagements … In international politics, fluctuations are inevitable, and the Middle East, or West Asia, is no exception. Hence, no one can credibly argue that the current geopolitical landscape in the region will persist indefinitely. While it is evident that Israel’s operations have inflicted damage on Hezbollah and Hamas, the resistance remains resilient and retains substantial grassroots support. Consequently, assertions that Iran’s regional standing has diminished and that concessions can be extracted from Iran under these conditions are both fallacious and irrelevant to the negotiation process … We categorically exclude extraneous issues from the scope of the negotiations.” 
    • When asked, “What if the counterpart insists on including regional issues in the negotiations?” Takht-Ravanchi responded: “When Tehran engages in consultations with European ambassadors, it is not that we avoid discussing the geopolitical context of West Asia. However, we categorically refuse to conflate these issues with the nuclear negotiations. The nuclear dossier is, in itself, highly intricate and will require extensive efforts to reach an agreement. Introducing additional, equally complex regional matters into the framework would render the negotiation process unmanageable.” 
    • “Two critical components are necessary to achieve a new agreement: confidence-building measures concerning Iran’s nuclear activities and sanctions relief by the opposing party. By engaging in negotiations, we signal our willingness to undertake confidence-building measures regarding our nuclear program. Not that such measures are warranted, as our nuclear activities are inherently peaceful, a fact substantiated by our track record, but we are willing to accommodate this demand as part of the negotiation process. In return, we unequivocally demand comprehensive sanctions relief.”  

The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.

Ali Alfoneh

Senior Fellow, AGSI

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