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Analysis

IRGC Claims It is Fighting ISIL on Iranian Soil

The December 2 edition of the Iran Media Review explores efforts by IRGC media to blame ISIL, “counterrevolutionary” forces, and others for unrest in Iran’s Kurdistan province.

Ali Alfoneh

3 min read

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders sought to legitimize their force deployment in Syria, and support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, by presenting it as an effort to prevent the spread of the activities of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant to Iran. Today, however, some media outlets close to the IRGC claim unrest in Iran’s Kurdistan province is directed by ISIL, while others blame the so-called “counterrevolution” for the unrest. Who is truly to blame for the unrest in Kurdistan? And to the extent the IRGC’s military intervention in the Syrian civil war indeed was aimed at preventing proliferation of ISIL activity, is the alleged emergence of ISIL on Iranian soil a sign of Iran’s failure in Syria? Neither answers to these questions nor introspection or self-criticism can be found in IRGC media; instead, the IRGC is resorting to blaming others. 

  • November 19: Hassan Askari, governor of Sanandaj, capital of Iran’s Kurdistan province, was quoted by Tasnim News, which is close to the IRGC, as saying: “These days, the counterrevolution is trying to transfer arms into the province to cause fratricide and death. Families ought to take care of their children and not allow them to take part in the gatherings.”  
  • November 27: Mashregh News, which is also close to the IRGC, in a lead article claimed: “Since 2012, Iraqi news sources have published numerous reports concerning cooperation of some Kurdish groups with ISIL forces … As neighborhood-level riots broke out in some urban centers, terrorist groups penetrated the borders to tie social events to insecurity. We must therefore analyze and assess the attack against Shah Cheragh shrine, and the ensuing attack in Izeh, and activities of groups such as Komala near the borders not as separate but as continuous events. Although these groups superficially appear as ideological opposites, they have found a common strategic objective, which is ruining Iran.” 

The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.

Ali Alfoneh

Senior Fellow, AGSI

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