Iranian Reformists Weaponize Assad’s Fall Against the IRGC

The collapse of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and manifest defeat of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ strategy in Syria have exposed the IRGC to public critique in Iran. While still short of demanding accountability, reformist politicians are openly calling for civilian control over the military and national security decision making. There is, however, no indication that the IRGC leadership is willing to voluntarily subject itself to civilian control or give up its decisive influence over national security decision making. On the contrary, as evident on the front page of IRGC mouthpiece Javan newspaper, it is likely to use the judiciary to prosecute and intimidate critics.  

• December 13: In two front page pieces, Javan newspaper warned against “those, who demoralize the public” by criticizing Iran’s debacle in Syria: 
  • Mohammad-Javad Akhavan in an editorial wrote: “Legal deterrents are prerequisites of psychological security. Today, the national security of our country requires the heads of the three branches of government to reduce the maneuvering room for those who aim to disturb the public mind.” 
  • Columnist Sajjad Azari wrote: “Last Wednesday, the leader of the revolution said in his address … ‘There are those who try to demoralize the people … Within Iran, nobody must do this, and if someone within Iran, in his statements or analysis, speaks in such a way to dishearten the people, this is a crime and must be prosecuted.’ Afterward, the judiciary issued a statement to the effect that people engaged in media or online media should abstain from addressing issues that disturb the public mind and intimidate people.”    
• December 16: Hossein Marashi, secretary-general of the reformist Kargozaran Party, analyzing recent events in Syria, said, as quoted by the party’s Sazandegi newspaper: 
  • “Everybody claims the events in Syria took place so fast … But there are also those who say what happened in Syria took place with a 13-year delay. For the past 13 years, the Syria case has been open. From the very beginning, Iranian statesmen disagreed on how to deal with this issue.” He continued that the late president, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, “expressed himself very bluntly, by suggesting to preserve the Baath Party, remove Assad, and replace him with someone like Farouk al-Sharaa,” the former Syrian foreign minister who died in 2014. He said, “Such were the suggestions on the table. I once asked Commander Suleimani,” a reference to the late IRGC Quds Force chief, Qassim Suleimani, “would it not have been better to reach an agreement between Assad and the opposition and form a coalition government? He said, ‘We approved of it, and this would have been the best solution, but Erdogan did not allow it to happen.’” 
  • Reflecting on the broader implications, Marashi emphasized the “lessons from Syria” and critiqued the role of military institutions in policymaking. Referring to the IRGC, he said that “Military organizations should not be in charge of policy. There must be no doubt that armed military organizations, in particular ideological organizations such as the Revolutionary Guard – the power and dignity of which is the power and dignity of us all – must be strong, and their needs must be attended to. However, policy must never be in their control. Armed forces must always remain under civilian control. For a time, we entrusted regional policies to a military organization and did not achieve the desired result. This is because military organizations are not politically capable. When dealing with a problem, politicians consider all options, including military, political, and cultural. The political leadership uses all means of political influence and uses all tools available to it in society. Consider the example of Turkey preventing us from creating a coalition government composed of Assad and the opposition to him. Well, the Baath Party could have remained in government, Assad would, due to popular opposition, abdicate and someone else could have replaced him.” He continued that, instead, “We deployed Iranian forces in Syria. There was a war, and Commander Suleimani fought. Russia assisted by providing air cover and Mr. Assad’s rule was stabilized. Had the politicians been in charge, Assad would have extended a hand of friendship to the opposition as soon as he stabilized his rule over Syria.” 

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