For the United States, the Houthi threat in the Red Sea should be treated as part of strategic competition instead of merely a local or regional challenge.
In recent months, as the United States has lifted restrictions on Ukrainian strikes into Russian territory, Russia has countered by increasing its support for the Houthis and the group’s attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Russia has already provided satellite tracking data of commercial vessels to the Houthis through Iranian intermediaries and is now threatening to supply the group with advanced anti-ship missiles. Such a move would allow the Houthis to present an even greater threat, potentially even endangering U.S. warships patrolling the waters.
Russia’s message is clear: If the United States continues to escalate in Ukraine, Russia will escalate in the Red Sea. Each conflict has proved more difficult than expected for the respective countries. In Ukraine, Russia’s initial plan of a lightning strike to decapitate the government has bogged down into a grueling war that is now stumbling into its fourth year. In the Red Sea, the United States has proved unable either to deter or degrade the Houthis to the point where the group ceases its attacks on commercial ships. At the same time, the United States is rapidly burning through its stockpiles, routinely firing $2 million rockets to defeat $20,000 drones. The United States’ ineffectiveness combined with the imbalance in costs has highlighted its vulnerabilities to both Russia and China.
Russia, for instance, may attempt to leverage the Houthis should its naval base in Lattakia, Syria come under threat following the fall of President Bashar al-Assad. Alternatively, should Russia believe its naval base on the Mediterranean is vulnerable, it may look to replace it with a base in the Red Sea, building on the reported presence of Russians embedded with the Houthis. Similarly, China may encourage both Russia and the Houthis, as U.S. missiles that are fired in the Red Sea cannot be utilized in the Pacific.
In many ways this is simply great power competition today. Conflicts bleed into and impact one another. No longer are there simply regional wars. Great power competition, like the Cold War that preceded it, is a global contest, and wars – whether large or small – have global ramifications. This has happened to the United States before in the Middle East.
In 2000, China published a white paper suggesting it did not need overseas military bases. Eight years later, after significant lobbying from the United States, China agreed to cooperate on anti-piracy patrols in the Red Sea. This was a significant victory for the United States and a sign that it could convince China to cooperate instead of only competing. Then, in 2017, China pointed to its continued presence in the Red Sea countering piracy as a compelling reason to establish a naval base in the area. The site it chose was Djibouti, right next door to the U.S. base. So, what in 2008 had been a victory for the United States – convincing China to cooperate and join the international community in combating a global threat – had, nearly a decade later, turned into a strategic disadvantage, providing China a foothold in the Red Sea.
Since the Houthi threat emerged following Hamas’ October 2023 attack on Israel and Israel’s response in Gaza, the United States has treated the Houthis as a Middle Eastern issue, part of the Iran problem set, and something closer to the counterterrorism wars of the past than the strategic competition of the present. However, the Houthis, as Russia is demonstrating, are linked both to the war in Eastern Europe and to the security challenge in the Pacific. The United States’ response, then, should be similarly nuanced and calibrated to grow alliances and impose costs on adversaries. Such a strategy would involve three broad moves.
First, the United States should significantly increase ally and partner participation. The free flow of trade is a global good that all countries in the international community have a role in maintaining. The United States should request additional naval support from NATO allies to help patrol the Red Sea, providing a more robust shield for commercial ships. The United States should also encourage non-NATO allies and partners to increase patrols in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea to stop Iranian weapons shipments to the Houthis. Regional partners, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman, also have a role to play both in stopping the overland shipment of missile components to the Houthis as well as further isolating the group in the region. Egypt, in particular, is paying a heavy economic cost for diminished sea traffic through the Suez Canal.
Second, the United States should increase the cost to its adversaries of working with and encouraging the Houthis. This may involve increased sanctions on Russia, although the impact of these may be more reputational than economic. For instance, if the United States can show how Russian support and aid is increasing the number and lethality of Houthi attacks on commercial ships, which are impacting economies in Africa and South America, it will be better positioned to isolate Russia diplomatically. The more desperate Russia gets in Ukraine, the more willing it is to make common cause with pariah groups. The United States should make sure it pays a reputational cost for such associations.
Similarly, the United States should demonstrate the costs of disrupted trade to China, which is heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East and is dealing with a struggling economy. No country has benefitted more from the last quarter of a century of global free trade than China. Should China continue to encourage Russia from the sidelines, the United States can show exactly how costly Russian-supported Houthi actions can be for China’s economy.
Finally, the United States should increase the cost to the Houthis of continued attacks. For much of the past year, the Houthis have largely avoided widespread retaliation. The United States, the United Kingdom, and, more recently, Israel, have all struck inside Yemen. But these strikes have largely targeted Houthi infrastructure and weapons caches. The United States should increase its offensive strikes, making clear to the Houthis that the commanders responsible for attacks in the Red Sea can and will be targeted.
The Houthi challenge did not emerge overnight and will not disappear quickly, but by taking a broader view of the problem and involving more actors, the United States will be better positioned to end the threat.
The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.
No matter who wins the presidency in November, the United States will need a strategy that allows it to protect free and open trade in the Red Sea without becoming bogged down in an open-ended conflict in Yemen.
While not yet successful, the Biden administration’s “deter and degrade” approach may prove to be an adaptable approach that can be modified into a winning strategy.
AGSI offers pragmatic, targeted policy recommendations for the Trump administration to maximize U.S. political and economic influence with the crucial emerging regional powers in the Gulf.
Both the United States and the Houthis needed a deal for different reasons. But the deal won’t create any sort of lasting or sustainable framework for peace in the Red Sea.
To eliminate the Houthis' capabilities, the United States will need the support of Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council, a body plagued by infighting and incompetence.
