Betting Big in Yemen

For much of the past year and a half, the Houthis in Yemen have baited the United States, essentially daring it to go to war once again in the Middle East. On March 15, the administration of President Donald J. Trump called what it believed to be the Houthi bluff, launching extensive and open-ended airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. Both the United States and the Houthis are betting big in Yemen, and the consequences of failure for either will be long reaching.

The United States is betting that it can inflict enough damage and destruction on the militia group in Yemen that it will either be “completely annihilated,” as Trump said or, at the very least, will have no choice but to cease its attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. If the United States is wrong, however, and extensive airstrikes don’t work, Washington will likely find itself involved in an open-ended conflict with no easy exit. Since the Houthis began attacking commercial shipping in late October 2023, the United States has had the same set of five basic options to respond to Houthi aggression. These options have not changed.

• Option #1: Defend only: The United States deploys naval assets to the Red Sea to shoot down Houthi missiles and drones to protect commercial shipping.
• Option #2: Limited strikes: The United States carries out targeted strikes on Houthi weapons depots, missile sites, and other areas that contribute directly to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.
• Option #3: Extensive strikes: The United States carries out widespread and extensive strikes on Houthi infrastructure and leaders across northern Yemen, essentially attempting to bomb the group into submission.
• Option #4: Supporting the anti-Houthi alliance: The United States provides extensive support to the anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen, basically using the coalition for ground troops in much the same way the United States utilized the Syrian Democratic Forces in its campaign to counter the Islamic State group.
• Options #5: Strike Iran: The United States bypasses the Houthis almost entirely and directly attacks Iran, which it blames for supporting and supplying the Houthis with weapons that allow them to target commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

Over the past year and a half, the United States has slowly but surely moved down this menu of options. Initially, in November and December 2023, the administration of then-President Joseph R. Biden Jr. took a defend only approach, eventually implementing Operation Prosperity Guardian, which was designed to protect and defend commercial shipping in the Red Sea. When that didn’t work, the Biden administration carried out limited strikes as part of Operation Poseidon Archer. Although there is some evidence to suggest that the strikes had an impact, the Houthis were neither sufficiently deterred nor degraded to the point where they were unable to carry out strikes in the Red Sea.

When the Trump administration took office in January, it quickly signaled its intent to carry out much more extensive strikes by designating the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization. On March 15, the United States moved to Option #3, conducting expansive airstrikes across much of northern Yemen. Simultaneously, Trump threatened Iran (Option #5) if Houthi attacks continue.

The Trump administration is betting that more strikes will tip the balance of power and force the Houthis to abandon attacks on commercial shipping. Perhaps the administration is correct, but others have made similar bets and come up short. For instance, in March 2015, Saudi Arabia estimated that six weeks of airstrikes would be sufficient to drive the Houthis from the Yemeni capital of Sanaa and reinstall Yemen’s United Nations-recognized government. That war just reached its 10th anniversary. Perhaps more sustained, more powerful, and more accurate strikes will bring about a different result for the United States, but if they don’t, the United States will likely need to utilize ground troops, either its own or someone else’s, to achieve its one goal: ending Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Should the conflict reach this stage, it will not be short, and it will not be easy. Instead, the United States will likely find itself in yet another open-ended conflict in the Middle East from which it will be difficult to extract itself.

The Houthis, on the other hand, are betting that they can absorb and survive as much devastation and destruction as the United States can inflict upon them. Some history may be instructive. From 2004-10, the Houthis fought six successive wars against Yemen’s central government. At various points in what has come to be known as the Houthi wars, the group looked to be on the verge of extinction, but each time it regrouped and rebounded. For the past 10 years, the Houthis have survived extensive airstrikes by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and now the group is looking to do the same against the United States. As Houthi leadership looks back across the past two decades, it believes that it fought and won a local war against the Yemeni government and that it fought and won a regional war against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In both cases, the Houthis won not by overpowering their opponents but rather by surviving whatever firepower their adversaries could inflict on them.

The Houthis are making a similar bet this time: that the group can withstand a sustained U.S. onslaught, rallying more Yemenis to its cause, and eventually advancing the group’s goal of acquiring more territory in Yemen.

The Houthis are risking more – this is an existential fight for the group – but the United States has a harder path to success. The Houthis, as their wars against the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition illustrate, need only to survive to win. The United States now believes that only a decisive defeat of the Houthis will end their attacks on commercial shipping. To achieve that, however, the United States will need more than extensive airstrikes, and it is quickly running out of options in Yemen.

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