Post-Assad Syria: A Testing Ground for Gulf Ambitions and U.S. Strategy

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024 and the formation of a transitional authority in Damascus have opened a new chapter in Syria’s long-running conflict. For the Gulf Arab states – particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar – this shift presents both an opportunity to shape Syria’s reconstruction and a test of their competing visions for postconflict influence in the Levant.

While the Gulf states share broad strategic goals – curbing Iranian influence, managing the refugee crisis, and preventing a jihadist resurgence – their approaches to the new Syrian administration diverge sharply in ideology, method, and pace. These differences reflect not only distinct national priorities but also deeper fractures in Gulf foreign policy shaped by years of regional rivalry and shifting alliances.

Syria has become a testing ground for these intra-Gulf dynamics, with each actor advancing its own model of state building, ideological alignment, and regional order. At the same time, the United States remains a critical player. Washington’s efforts to empower regional partners, mediate between competing ambitions, and reassert influence through economic diplomacy have introduced both new openings and fresh constraints.

Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Shift: From Opposition to Reengagement

Riyadh’s approach to Syria has undergone a dramatic transformation – from regime change advocate to pragmatic power broker. Once a leading sponsor of the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia initially viewed the 2011 uprising as a chance to end Assad’s Iran-aligned rule, channeling support to armed groups and pushing for Damascus’ isolation. By 2015, however, Riyadh began to recalibrate, and, by 2023, it had normalized relations with Assad’s regime. This reversal laid the groundwork for a more strategic reengagement once Assad fell.

The defeat of Assad and the emergence of a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-led transitional government prompted Saudi Arabia to reengage Syria with renewed urgency. Framing itself as a stabilizing force, Riyadh’s current strategy is anchored in several overlapping priorities: safeguarding Syrian territorial integrity, limiting Turkish and Qatari influence, halting Iranian entrenchment, curbing Islamist radicalization, facilitating refugee returns, and ending the Captagon drug trade. These priorities reflect not only Saudi Arabia’s national security concerns but also its ambition to shape a new regional order centered on state-led reconstruction and geopolitical containment.

In January, Saudi Arabia hosted a summit in Riyadh, bringing together foreign ministers and international representatives to discuss Syria’s reconstruction and transitional stability. The summit emphasized humanitarian efforts, political reforms, and regional security as priorities for Syria’s recovery. Importantly, the gathering signaled Riyadh’s intent to lead the Arab world’s engagement with postconflict Syria on its own terms. Beyond diplomacy, Saudi Arabia has been actively involved in humanitarian aid to Syria. On the economic front, in May, Saudi Arabia and Qatar settled Syria’s $15.5 billion World Bank debt – Riyadh’s first financial commitment on behalf of the transitional government – paving the way for the World Bank to resume support and operations.

Though Saudi Arabia has pledged to contribute to a proposed $6.5 billion international aid package for Syria, it has yet to commit substantial reconstruction funding – presumably awaiting assurance that its core strategic conditions, including the exclusion of Iranian-backed militias and progress toward a secular, inclusive government, are met. This cautious posture reflects both Riyadh’s desire to retain leverage and its awareness of U.S. hesitations about long-term involvement in Syrian reconstruction.

A key pillar of Riyadh’s new approach to Syria is its evolving partnership with Turkey. What began as cautious de-escalation has matured into a tactical alliance driven by shared strategic interests. Riyadh and Ankara are united in their determination to curb Iranian influence in post-Assad Syria and to address their own security concerns. Joint Saudi-Turkish lobbying was instrumental in persuading Washington – reportedly despite Israeli objections – to grant limited sanctions relief for transitional authorities and affiliated projects. This behind-the-scenes diplomacy underscores Riyadh’s ability to navigate U.S. redlines while pursuing its own vision for regional stabilization.

UAE: The Calculated Realist

Among the three leading Gulf Arab states, the UAE has taken the most cautious and ideologically driven approach toward the new Syrian administration. This stance reflects the UAE’s long-standing suspicion of Islamist political movements – a concern that has deeply shaped its regional diplomacy since the 2011 Arab uprisings. Abu Dhabi views the Syrian transition not only through geopolitical calculations but also as an ideological battleground.

This cautious posture was evident during Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to the UAE in mid-April, his second official trip to a Gulf capital after Saudi Arabia. Although Emirati leaders welcomed him, their public messaging remained measured. Nevertheless, concrete steps followed. President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan announced plans to restore commercial air travel with Syria, and the UAE-linked Eighth Brigade in southern Syria’s Daraa province declared it would disband and integrate into the national army. These moves signal a pragmatic willingness to support Syria’s stabilization, while maintaining direct influence on the ground.

Since 2011, Abu Dhabi has positioned itself as a counterrevolutionary force, seeking to contain Islamist factions it views as a threat. Mohammed bin Zayed consistently argues that all Islamist groups – from mainstream parties to militant offshoots – share the goal of establishing theocratic rule under the guise of a caliphate. This worldview informs policies aimed at marginalizing Islamist actors and promoting a secular regional order. In Syria, this translates into efforts to bolster technocratic governance, support military integration, and prevent HTS from dominating the political landscape.

The UAE has formally designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization and, early in the year, added 19 affiliated individuals and entities to its domestic terror list – an unmistakable signal that it will resist any empowerment of Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups in Syria. Despite improving ties with Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood’s main regional sponsor, Abu Dhabi, remains wary of Ankara’s influence, viewing it as a potential source of instability. While the rivalry with Turkey has softened somewhat, it persists fundamentally over the legitimacy of political Islam in the region. The same can be said for relations between the UAE and Qatar.

Beyond direct diplomacy, the UAE has pursued a discreet security role, reportedly hosting backchannel talks between Syria and Israel focused on intelligence cooperation. This highlights Abu Dhabi’s ambition to act as a stabilizing intermediary, bridging Arab and Israeli interests in a post-Assad Levant. The UAE is deepening economic ties with Syria as well. In May, Dubai-based DP World signed an $800 million preliminary deal with Damascus to develop and operate a terminal at the Port of Tartus – the first such agreement since U.S. sanctions began to ease. This port deal, alongside Syria’s decision to shift currency printing operations from Russia to the UAE and Germany, is part of Abu Dhabi’s strategic investment in Syria’s commercial infrastructure as a tool of influence, even as it avoids headline-grabbing reconstruction pledges.

Humanitarian and reconstruction efforts also play a key role in the UAE’s approach. Between 2011 and 2023, it provided over $1.1 billion in aid to Syria and Syrian refugees. The creation of the UAE Aid Agency in late 2024, combined with Mohammed bin Zayed’s expressed “keenness to support” Syria’s reconstruction, underscores a sustained effort to shape Syria’s postwar trajectory. For Abu Dhabi, supporting reconstruction is not just about rebuilding infrastructure but about ensuring that legitimate state institutions – not Islamist groups – become the primary providers of security and services.

By positioning itself as a pragmatic partner in Syria’s recovery, the UAE aims to contain threats, counter regional rivals, and shape outcomes from within. This blend of cautious pragmatism and ideological conviction reflects Abu Dhabi’s distinctive brand of realpolitik in the Levant.

Qatar: From Regime Opponent to Early Partner of Post-Assad Syria

Qatar was once the Assad regime’s most vocal and active adversary among the Gulf states. Early in the conflict, it poured funds into opposition groups and even advocated for Arab military intervention. As recently as 2022, Qatar backed efforts to unite disparate opposition groups, maintained a hard-line policy of nonrecognition of the Assad regime, and refused to restore diplomatic ties. At the May 2023 Arab League summit –  Assad’s first since Syria’s suspension – Qatar’s emir walked out before Assad’s speech.

Yet following Assad’s ouster in December 2024, Doha moved rapidly to reposition itself as an early and influential partner to Syria’s new authorities. Qatar was the first Gulf country to engage with the HTS-led coalition that deposed the regime, announcing on December 11 that it would reopen its embassy in Damascus, with operations resuming just six days later.

Qatar’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Mohammed Al-Khulaifi, was the first high-ranking official from the Gulf to visit Syria, ending a more than 13-year rift between the two countries. That visit was followed by Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani’s landmark visit in January, the first head of state to meet with the new leadership in Damascus.

In conjunction with these visits, Doha pledged to maintain the humanitarian aid air bridge to Syria for as long as needed and provide significant reconstruction assistance. It is funding operations at Damascus International Airport and supporting a temporary increase in public-sector wages – up to $29 million per month for an initial three-month period.

In March, as part of a deal with Jordan and the United Nations Development Program, Qatar began supplying Syria with natural gas, producing 400 megawatts of power daily. Qatar is also collaborating with Turkey to dispatch floating power plants to Syria following the easing of U.S. sanctions to alleviate the country’s severe electricity shortages. Talks are underway between Doha and Damascus to modernize Syria’s telecommunications sector. In addition, Qatar is reportedly training small police units to stabilize urban areas.

This strategic shift reflects Doha’s pragmatic recalibration from ideological opposition to active engagement, leveraging its close ties with Turkey and international institutions to solidify influence in Syria’s fragile recovery. For Qatar, early involvement is not only about rebuilding infrastructure but about securing a long-term role in shaping Syria’s postconflict political and economic architecture, particularly through support of Islamist-aligned actors and HTS-linked technocrats, a stance that occasionally diverges from U.S. priorities but complements Ankara’s regional ambitions.

Qatar’s transformation from a leading Assad opponent to an early postconflict partner reflects the wider Gulf trend of pragmatic repositioning – a shift from ideological rigidity to strategic engagement aimed at shaping Syria’s new order.

U.S. Leverage and Regional Rivalries

The announcement in late May of a $7 billion energy deal between Syria and a Qatari-Turkish-U.S. consortium – facilitated by the newly appointed U.S. envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack – marked a striking development in the geopolitics of postconflict reconstruction. The deal, which aims to rehabilitate Syria’s devastated power sector, coincides with Barrack’s symbolic hoisting of the U.S. flag over the ambassador’s residence in Damascus and his call for a nonaggression pact between Syria and Israel. These gestures signal more than just transactional diplomacy; they suggest a U.S.-backed attempt to reweave the region’s fractured political fabric through economic interdependence and de-escalation.

Moreover, the U.S. role, while publicly presented as enabling stabilization, also reflects a desire to contain Iranian and Russian influence without the burdens of a large-scale U.S. footprint. The energy deal, framed as a lever for reconstruction, doubles as a soft-power instrument for shaping Syria’s internal balance and regional alignments.

Competing Gulf Visions in a Fractured Syria

The fall of the Assad regime has not only reopened Syria to regional reintegration but also exposed the fragmented ambitions of Gulf powers seeking to shape its future. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are each advancing distinct – and at times conflicting – visions for Syria’s reconstruction, governance, and regional alignment.

While united in their desire to counter Iranian influence and prevent jihadist resurgence, they diverge sharply in ideology, pace, and preferred partners, turning Syria into a theater for broader Gulf rivalries. For Riyadh, Syria is a proving ground for a new brand of state-centric pragmatism. For Abu Dhabi, it is a frontline in the ideological struggle against political Islam. For Doha, it offers a chance to reassert influence through early engagement and alignment with Islamist-tied actors.

Against this backdrop, the United States is recalibrating its Syria policy. By backing regional actors and prioritizing economic diplomacy – rather than committing to large-scale reconstruction or a direct military presence – the Trump administration is testing a lighter-touch model of influence. Its support for a Qatari-Turkish-U.S. energy consortium, coupled with renewed diplomatic engagement, signals a shift toward burden sharing and regional ownership. But this approach may leave Washington with diminished leverage should regional partners prioritize conflicting agendas.

Ultimately, post-Assad Syria is becoming less a unified project of stabilization than a contested space of experimentation – for Gulf rivalries, U.S. strategy, and the reshaping of the regional order. How these overlapping ambitions play out will determine Syria’s trajectory and could help determine the durability of the fragile alignments now taking shape in the region.

The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.