The Gulf Arab states’ engagement with the countries of the Horn of Africa dates back at least to the postcolonial era of the 1950s and 60s. Over recent decades, however, the Horn of Africa has become a region of increasing geostrategic and economic importance, as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have sought to establish a long-term military and commercial presence on both sides of the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, in an effort to cement their status as regional powers.
Even as the Gulf Arab states are deepening their engagement in the region, the Red Sea basin has also re-emerged at the heart of global geostrategic competition among China, Europe, the United States, and Russia. This intense interest has given far greater leverage to Horn of Africa leaders to bargain for better deals or play patrons off one another.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia recently demonstrated they could leverage relationships to play a positive role, brokering a historic rapprochement between bitter rivals Ethiopia and Eritrea that could be transformational for the region in terms of economics, security, and stability. But at the same time, the Saudi and Emirati rivalry with Turkey and Qatar has spilled over, exacerbating pre-existing divisions and raising questions about whether the Gulf Arab states are more of a destabilizing force in the region. The long-term implications of a growing Gulf presence in the region and what this means for local political dynamics is unclear. What is evident, however, is that as Gulf Arab states exert greater influence in the Horn of Africa, the region’s future is being reimagined.
To learn more about Gulf Arab relations with the Horn of Africa region, watch the videos below with Mohammed Baharoon, Elizabeth Dickinson, Michael Woldemariam, and Annette Weber.
This paper was developed as part of AGSIW’s Gulf Rising series analyzing the energized role of the Gulf Arab states in the international system. The series looks beyond Gulf Arab relations with the United States to examine ties with other key countries and regions. Additionally, it investigates motivations behind Gulf Arab states’ foreign policy choices and evaluates the implications for U.S. foreign policy toward the Gulf Arab states and the region.
The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.
Trump’s visit to the UAE, centered on artificial intelligence, investment, and defense, will not only highlight the scale of Emirati aspirations but also reveal the complex interplay of state, business, and family networks now shaping the U.S.-UAE relationship.
On July 9, the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a historic peace accord and a set of trade and security agreements ending a long-running conflict that has been a key regional fault line destabilizing the Horn of Africa. The previously unimaginable trip to Asmara, Eritrea’s capital, by Ethiopia’s new prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, capped...
On April 8, a group of officials from the United Arab Emirates flew on a government jet from Abu Dhabi to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. Onboard were three bags containing $9.6 million for the salaries of 2,407 Somali National Army soldiers, including the counterterrorism troops that UAE special forces have been training since 2015....
On February 22, Djibouti seized control of the Doraleh Container Terminal from its joint owner and operator, the Dubai-based DP World. The seizure was not wholly unexpected and was the culmination of Djibouti’s deteriorating bilateral ties with the United Arab Emirates and a lost legal battle with DP World to renegotiate the terms of the...
On June 28, AGSIW hosted a public panel discussion on GCC-Horn of Africa relations. Part of the Gulf Rising series, speakers explored the regional and domestic issues that have defined the Gulf states’ foreign policy choices toward Horn of Africa countries and vice versa, as well as the implications for regional stability and U.S. interests....
