Dominance versus Disruption: Asymmetry in Gulf Security
This paper examines the defining characteristics of asymmetrical hostilities, in particular, the imbalance created when different security objectives – dominance or disruption – come into play.
Saudi pilots sits in the cockpit of a fighter jet as part of U.S.-led coalition airstrikes on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and other targets in Syria, in Saudi Arabia, Sept. 24, 2014. (AP Photo/Saudi Press Agency)
Executive Summary
The Gulf Arab states and Iran have very different security objectives that require disparate financial outlays to meet their strategic goals. Gulf Arab states spend a massive amount of money on defense and they outspend Iran many times over. Iran generally is able to achieve its security aims efficiently and certainly less expensively than are the Gulf Arab states. While this imbalance has prompted considerable discussion, this paper considers the contrasting security objectives of the Gulf Arab states and Iran as a major cause.
This paper analyzes the security objectives of the Gulf Arab states and Iran. It shows that the Gulf Arab states can only prosper if they or their Western partners (notably the United States) dominate their security area of interest. They cannot survive long if sea or air lanes are closed; they are integrated into the global economy in a manner that requires uninterrupted commercial and military traffic; and any disruption damages their security.
Iran, on the other hand, can generally achieve its security aims if it simply disrupts the regional security environment. Disruption is far cheaper than domination – a spoiler strategy can achieve its aims at a fraction of the cost of that of a rival, who must maintain smoothly operating international trade.
By categorizing the security objectives of the Gulf Arab states and Iran as either dominance or disruption, analysts can better understand relative disparities in defense resources.
Correction: This paper originally stated the Kuwaitis fly F-15 fighters developed by the U.S. Air Force. Kuwait flies F-18 fighters developed by the U.S. Navy.
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Biden will likely put weapons sales to the Gulf on the back burner, but, at the end of the day, the administration’s positions on arms sales will reflect continuity, not change.
Iran will do as it always has – seek to quietly develop asymmetric capabilities, ideally built domestically, and only purchase the few items that it cannot make hoping to counter key U.S. military capabilities.
The United States does not have attractive options as far as its military presence in Iraq, but it has workable ones to achieve its strategic and security goals.
On May 24, the Trump administration issued a national emergency declaration citing tensions with Iran to bypass congressional opposition to arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan.
AGSIW hosted a briefing on arms sales to Saudi Arabia with DB Des Roches, an associate professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies at the National Defense University.
