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Analysis

IRGC Syria Veteran Criticizes Assad and Putin

The January 10 edition of the Iran Media Review explores statements made by an IRGC commander criticizing the Assad regime and Russia’s role in Syria.

Ali Alfoneh

4 min read

On January 7, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Behrouz Esbati, the public affairs director of the Joint Force Cyber Command and a veteran of Iran’s military operations in Syria, delivered a speech in Tehran in which he criticized former President Bashar al-Assad and what he described as Russia’s role in the collapse of the regime in Damascus. IRGC commanders have consistently criticized the Assad regime since the outbreak of public protests in Syria in 2011, and there are also many examples of public IRGC criticism of Russia. This raises two questions: Why did Iran support Assad to the very end, and why isn’t Iran reevaluating its perception of Russia as a strategic ally when IRGC commanders believe Russia behaves like an adversary and not an ally? 

  • January 7: In a recording of his speech released by Tabnak News Agency, which is affiliated with former IRGC Chief Commander Mohsen Rezaei, Esbati said:  
    • “Frequently, I am asked: ‘Was Bashar a traitor? Did he deliberately orchestrate these outcomes?’ My answer is no. Mr. Bashar was ideologically committed to the axis of resistance, but his conceptualization of its scope differed markedly from ours. His vision of Syria’s role in the axis of resistance was notably limited … He would say: ‘In the axis of the resistance, my role is confined to serving as a logistical platform for your efforts. You may use Syrian airspace to transport arms and munitions, but I will not engage Israel militarily.’ This constrained interpretation of the axis of resistance reflected a fundamental divergence in strategic objectives.” 
    • “One of our great commanders who secretly visited Damascus to meet Bashar,” most likely a reference to the Quds Force chief, Brigadier General Ismail Qaani, “told me: ‘This guy is bewitched!’ I told him: ‘The boys from Popular Mobilization Forces are ready. They were mobilized and ready for deployment in the front. But as soon as they try to enter the scene, Israeli and American planes will massacre them. We need air cover. Only Russians can provide it. I talked with Bashar for more than half an hour, but in the end, Bashar declined to talk with the Russians and said: ‘No, you call the Russians yourself!’” 
    • “The Russian Federation played a significant role in the systemic collapse of Syria. Following the ‘Deluge of al-Aqsa’ operation,” a reference to Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack against Israel, “their actions were closely aligned with the Zionist regime’s strategic objectives. For instance, during the Israeli strike on our intelligence headquarters, where Martyr Sadeq,” a reference to Haj Sadeq, also known as Yousef Omidzadeh and Hojjat-Allah Omidvar, the Quds Force intelligence chief in Syria who was killed January 20, 2024, “was targeted, the Russians deliberately deactivated their radar systems, granting Israel unimpeded operational freedom.” 
    • “When we proposed a comprehensive defense strategy to Mr. Bashar, our approach emphasized ground operations to dismantle the opposition forces’ logistical and operational networks. Conversely, the Russians advocated for a primarily aerial campaign, promising decisive preemptive strikes that would neutralize enemy capabilities – particularly in Idlib. Despite our objections, Mr. Bashar opted for the Russian strategy. Over 20 days, three high-intensity air campaigns were executed. However, their strikes primarily targeted uninhabited deserts and civilian residential areas, sparing the operational infrastructure of Tahrir al-Sham. Russian reports falsely claimed significant damage to Tahrir al-Sham’s capabilities. Our intelligence units contradicted these claims, confirming that Tahrir al-Sham remained operationally intact. Yet our warnings were dismissed. Ultimately, the Russian intervention, marked by strategic miscalculations and actions aligned with interests of the Zionist regime, played a decisive role in the systemic collapse of Syria.” 

The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.

Ali Alfoneh

Senior Fellow, AGSI

Analysis

The Pragmatist Who Came In From the Cold: Ali Larijani, Iran’s New Supreme National Security Council Secretary

An Iraqi-born native of Najaf but an unmistakably Iranian nationalist, Ali Larijani is expected to leverage his record of bureaucratic competence and global fluency to coordinate Iran’s security bureaucracy.

Ali Alfoneh

2 min read

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Iran: Emergence of Collective Leadership Amid Low-Intensity Conflict

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Ali Alfoneh

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The current cease-fire may just be an interregnum between rounds of conflict between Israel and Iran, as Iranian decision makers appear more inclined to pursue strategic parity than capitulate.

Ali Alfoneh

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Events

Sep 16, 2025

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Women carry Iranian flags under the Azadi (freedom) monument tower during a rally commemorating the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Tehran, Iran, Feb. 10. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)
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On June 23, AGSI hosted a discussion on the United States' attack on Iranian nuclear sites.

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On June 16, AGSI hosted a discussion on Israel's attack on Iran.

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Apr 29, 2025

The Real Deal? Are Washington and Tehran Closer to a Compromise?

On April 29, AGSI hosted a discussion on the U.S.-Iranian nuclear negotiations.

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In this photo released by Iranian Foreign Ministry, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, left, meets his Omani counterpart Sayyid Badr Albusaidi prior to negotiations with U.S. Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff in Muscat, Oman, Saturday, April 12, 2025. (Iranian Foreign Ministry via AP)
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