Iranian Media Reacts to the U.S. National Security Strategy

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-aligned Javan seemed almost disappointed that the latest U.S. National Security Strategy document, published in November, contains only three references to Iran. But Iranian technocrats appeared reassured that the Middle East has receded as a U.S. priority, and that regime change in Tehran no longer seems to be on Washington’s agenda.

• December 6: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Mashregh News compared the U.S. National Security Strategy document with the first administration of President Donald J. Trump’s National Security Strategy document, released in December 2017:
  • “The previous version was drafted using a combined diplomacy-military model in which diplomacy accounted for roughly 60% of the weight, whereas, in the new document, the military component rises to about 70%. Moreover, in the earlier document, Iran was depicted as a medium-level challenger to the United States, while in the new one this threat has been downgraded, though the focus remains on the nuclear file.”
• December 7: Amir Ali Abolfath, an expert in American studies, was quoted in economic newspaper Donya-ye Eqtesad:
  • “In the 2025 document, Iran is no longer considered a strategic threat to the United States, nor is it placed among the rogue states, because – according to the authors of the 2025 document – Iran is in decline.”
  • As for expected implications for U.S. policy toward Iran, Abolfath wrote: “From the American perspective the nuclear issue is considered resolved, and therefore there is no reason to negotiate over Iran’s nuclear program … Furthermore, the United States is not seeking regime change … The 2025 document likewise states that if the Abraham Accords expand, Iran will become isolated, and to further isolate Iran it recommends expanding these accords. Military intervention in west Asia is not something they are contemplating … They believe that the Iran-Israel issue is not over, and that the conflict may continue in other forms. But for now, the Americans themselves do not intend to take the initiative in launching an attack against Iran.”
• December 7: Technocratic Sazandegi published an article asserting:
  • “This is an approach in which Washington has replaced direct intervention with remote management: Iran is no longer viewed as an enemy to be confronted militarily but as a target for smart containment, and the Middle East has ceased to be the center of gravity in U.S. foreign policy. In this context, Tom Barrack’s remarks are more than a personal analysis; they reflect an official orientation – no to regime change and yes to managed coexistence – toward a region that is no longer the top priority yet remains vital for energy security and for Israel.”
• December 7: Rahman Qahremanpour, a foreign policy analyst, wrote in Cabinet mouthpiece Iran:
  • While the Middle East no longer appears to be a strategic priority, “if regional security is threatened, the document makes clear that the United States will act without delay. The reference in the document to keeping strategic straits open most likely points to the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb. The purpose of this emphasis is to signal that, in the new order the United States envisions for the Middle East, Iran must not pose a threat to American interests in the region.”
• December 8: Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei was quoted in hard-line Kayhan:
  • “This document is less a U.S. national security strategy and, at least regarding west Asia, more a national security strategy for the Zionist regime. All of the United States’ focus is on enforcing the Zionist regime’s dominance over the region, which in itself amounts to American complicity in the continuation of the crimes committed by that regime.”
• December 8: IRGC-affiliated Javan published an article comparing the new national security strategy to previous documents:
  • “While the 2025 document mentions Iran only three times, the 2022 document referred to Iran seven times, and the 2017 document addressed the Iran issue 17 times. Thus, one can say that this document exhibits a kind of disregard and denial of Iran that is almost unprecedented.”
  • “The reference to energy routes as a red line – specifically the Strait of Hormuz – shows that, although the United States is compelled to shift its focus from west to east Asia, it nevertheless recognizes that threats to U.S. interests in west Asia persist, and that, despite its claims, it has not been able to resolve its problems in the Middle East.”

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