Iranian Media Reacts to Snapback

On September 28, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom invoked the “snapback” mechanism over Iran’s “significant nonperformance” under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The move, which reinstates all pre-2015 United Nations sanctions, was condemned by Iran, China, and Russia. Uncertainty remains, however, over Beijing and Moscow’s future position: Will they remain true to their declaration of solidarity with Iran or comply with the U.N. sanctions? Iranian media speculated on possible countermeasures, including withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or parliamentary revocation of its ratification.

• September 28: In an editorial in reformist Etemad, international affairs analyst Ali Vadae outlined three scenarios:
  • “A temporary risk-management agreement is still on the table … to reduce the risk of explosion, the parties arrive at a temporary understanding, for example,” lifting sanctions on Iran’s oil exports in exchange for limited monitoring of Iran’s nuclear facilities to buy time.
  • “An unmanaged confrontation and nuclear breakout … provokes a full-blown crisis and makes the possibility of direct warfare more likely.”
  • “A scenario of mutual flexibility … driven by the heavy costs of confrontation.”
• September 28: Technocratic Sazandegi interviewed veteran diplomat Jalal Sadatian and Amir Ali Abolfath, a professor of American studies:
  • Sadatian: “China and Russia may resist the sanctions, and Iran may engage in continued negotiations … But China and Russia may follow the United Nations sanctions, which would direct Iran on a dangerous course … Yet these countries may also maintain their relations with Iran in return for Iran remaining committed to its obligations under the JCPOA.”
  • Abolfath: “Future dynamics depend on Iran’s reaction. Neither the leader of the revolution nor the president nor the foreign minister have threatened a radical move, and Iranian officials have consistently stressed that Iran will neither pursue nuclear weapons nor withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.”
• September 29: An editorial in hard-line Kayhan urged Iranian decision makers to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, using Article X of the treaty:
  • “The question now is whether 22 years of extortionist challenges from the United States and Europe, the other parties’ failure to honor their commitments, and especially America’s military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, are not undeniable examples of endangering our nation’s interests and sovereignty. If they are, and they indeed are, why should we not make use of the legal option of withdrawing from the NPT?”
  • “Now that honorable officials are not willing to withdraw from the NPT, we can – and it is also our legal right to – revoke our ratification while still maintaining our signature of the treaty. The result would be that, by keeping the signature, we accept the spirit of the treaty, which is the ‘nonproduction of nuclear weapons,’ but we would not accept or recognize the safeguards that stem from ratification. In other words, we would acknowledge that we are not pursuing nuclear weapons (the spirit of the treaty), but we would have no commitment to accept inspections or the presence of inspectors. In this situation, our emphasis would remain on the nondiversion of our nuclear program toward nuclear weapons, but since we have withdrawn our ratification of the treaty, we would not bear the slightest obligation to implement safeguards or allow inspectors into our country.”
• September 29: In a column in Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Javan, columnist Rasoul Sanaei-Rad wrote:
  • “Perhaps activation of the snapback mechanism … would produce a shock in the initial phase and psychological effects aligned with the designers’ objectives; but once that phase passes, and it collides with the realities of a multipolar world that opposes American unilateralism and its Western allies, its impact will sharply diminish and be neutralized.”

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