An Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps speed boat fires a missile during a military exercise, July 28. (Sepahnews via AP)
During its annual “Great Prophet” military exercises in late July, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struck dummy targets, including a replica of a U.S. aircraft carrier, as it did in 2015, and a U.S. missile defense system. But the IRGC also launched two hitherto unidentified ballistic missiles from underground positions in the Iranian desert. Who was the intended audience of the IRGC’s spectacle? In the wake of numerous unconventional attacks, widely attributed to the United States and/or Israel, against Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, the United States and the Iranian public (the latter in desperate need of a morale boost) appear to be the target audiences.
Over the years, the Islamic Republic has perfected its unconventional warfare tactics, so it is capable of firing rockets and mortars at U.S. positions in Iraq, disrupting international shipping, and attacking oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia with a degree of plausible deniability as various Iranian proxies accept responsibility for the attacks. But increasingly, Iran’s adversaries are giving the Islamic Republic a taste of its own medicine: A string of unclaimed and unattributable explosions, fires, and other incidents at Iran’s nuclear, missile, and other industrial facilities have plagued Iran since June. The incidents have occurred following the United States’ targeted killing of senior Iranian and allied commanders and amid President Donald J. Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran. Questions regarding culpability have been met with ambiguous statements from Israeli officials.
While the precise purpose of the recent attacks in Iran is not known, they are unlikely to deter the Islamic Republic’s proxy warfare against the United States and its allies. In the words of General Frank McKenzie, U.S. Central Command chief, the Iranians are likely to continue “to operate through their proxies indirectly against us.” However, if the United States is responsible for the attacks, the Trump administration may have found a way to publicly humiliate the regime in Tehran and yet avoid an all-out war.
In part, the humiliation is due to Iran’s inability to retaliate in kind or at the same level, which is apparent from the reactions of officials in Tehran. Embarrassed by the incidents, on July 15, Brigadier General Ismail Qaani, commander of the expeditionary Quds Force of the IRGC, almost took credit for the fire onboard the U.S.S. Bonhomme Richard docked in San Diego. He described it as a “response to America’s crimes,” and warned: “Very hard days and trying accidents await America and the Zionist regime.”
Qaani did not explain how he managed to cause a fire on a U.S. Navy warship in California, but the IRGC’s navy managed to stage an attack against a replica of a U.S. aircraft carrier off the coast of Iran during the July military exercises. The tactical value of the maneuver of attacking a stationary model unable to defend itself is questionable. Of greater significance was the presumably remote launch of unidentified ballistic missiles from underground sites in the Iranian desert. According to one assessment, by dispersing the missile silos in underground tunnels in the desert, the IRGC tries to avoid their detection by the United States and increase their survivability.
In his commentary, Abbas Haji-Najjari, columnist for the pro-IRGC Javan daily, wrote about both the political and military dimensions of the message conveyed by the exercises but emphasized the political message: “The recent American plot to provoke unrest and popular protests in Iran in the past couple of weeks was defeated.” He continued: “The U.S. attempt at extending the arms embargo against Iran is useless because Iran has reached self-sufficiency.” Haji-Najjari emphasized that Iran’s regional influence is unchanged, despite the targeted killing of the former Quds Force commander, Major General Qassim Suleimani, in January, adding that the China-Iran strategic partnership agreement demonstrates the failure of Washington’s “attempts at diplomatically isolating Iran.”
Ultimately, the IRGC’s military exercises are little more than ineffective political propaganda for both U.S. and Iranian audiences. They are unlikely to affect the Trump administration’s Iran policy, including overt and covert pressure campaigns. And the Iranian public will not gain greater trust in the ability of the regime to fend off outside pressure as long as Iran experiences mysterious attacks against its nuclear and missile programs.
The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.
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