The small Gulf state of Qatar secures itself in two ways. First, its security is based on close relations with the United States stemming from the provision of the near-irreplaceable Al Udeid Air Base for U.S. military use. Second, diversifying this dependency, Qatar has buried itself into the energy supplies of a range of the world’s more powerful states with its provision of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Add to this a small, stable, and well-provided for set of citizens, and the Qatari state is well-secured.
But, with few external security concerns and fewer domestic ones, Qatar’s leaders overreached during the Arab Spring. In trying to support revolutions around the region, Qatar (and a range of other states) failed, sowed division, and angered regional states.
Challenges have now emerged from Qatar’s three closest neighbors that are testing its two-pronged security modus operandi. Though Qatar’s U.S. and international relations have proved to be resilient and are, thus far, supportive of Qatar, there have been deeply worrying moments. It remains to be seen how long Qatar can defy the geopolitical gravity of its region.
The role of Gulf Arab states in Russia-Ukraine mediation reflects their rising global influence and the benefits of hedging and balancing in foreign policy.
Where Hamas operates from matters less than the broader absence of any coherent vision – from Israel, the Palestinians, or the international community – for future Arab leadership in Gaza.
The new Shura Council is neither a democratic wand changing Qatar’s political culture nor a pointless exercise. Instead, it is a small evolutionary step in the state’s governance in a more democratic direction.
