U.S. Moves Toward New Trump Doctrine for the Gulf

The long-standing partnerships between the United States and the Gulf Arab states have evolved at a remarkable pace over the past decade. President Donald J. Trump’s May visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates accelerated this evolution and opened up new opportunities for both the U.S. and Gulf economies. This rapidly changing region remains strategically crucial, and a new paradigm – a Trump Doctrine – that recognizes this importance is taking shape.

The traditional basis of U.S. policy in the Gulf – the Carter Doctrine – has not been updated since its promulgation in the 1980s. Robust actions by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush to reflag oil tankers under threat and to liberate Kuwait cemented a now-anachronistic understanding that U.S.-Gulf Arab partnerships were based on a simple exchange of oil for security.

The Carter Doctrine clearly addressed the primary political, security, and economic concerns in the Gulf at the time: threats from powerful neighbors to borders and oil supplies. But the threats facing Gulf countries today are different and require new, cooperative responses and a new paradigm. Yet, recent U.S. administrations’ “pivot to Asia” and decisions not to use force in the Gulf – particularly after Iran-linked attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 and the Abu Dhabi airport in 2022 – created uncertainty among Washington’s Gulf partners about when, how, and even if the United States would act in their defense.

This uncertainty has led Gulf states to seek strategic diversification through unilateral action, closer ties with China and Russia, outreach to Israel, and even detente-like bilateral dialogues with Iran. While understandable and in some cases worthy of U.S. support, this strategic diversification arises from a festering problem in the current interpretation of the Carter Doctrine – a doctrine that promised oil for security but never clarified the terms, scope, and conditions for the United States to deploy forces in defense of the Gulf.

For two generations the Carter Doctrine protected the flow of Gulf oil onto world markets. Today, however, the United States buys 80% less oil from the Gulf than it did 20 years ago (although Gulf production remains critical for price stability). Fortunately, as the president’s recent trip demonstrated, other mutually beneficial opportunities have emerged alongside oil and natural gas. Gulf governments want U.S. investment and technology, especially artificial intelligence, to build the information infrastructure for the Middle East, Africa, and beyond. And U.S. companies are equally enthusiastic. If Gulf governments have truly chosen U.S. tech over Chinese and other sources, U.S. strategic economic, political, and security influence will deepen for the coming generation.

A Trump Doctrine

This Trump administration has charted a fundamentally different approach toward the Gulf, one that might be called the Trump Doctrine. So, what does this new Trump Doctrine look like, and what’s in it for the United States?

On the security front, the Gulf Arab states face several challenges, notably Iran’s missiles and drones, Iran’s weakened network of proxy militias, and the threat from radical Sunni groups, such as the Islamic State group. For the United States to maintain its indispensable role as security provider, it must renew Gulf Arab confidence in Washington’s security commitment. It must maximize financial and military burden sharing within clear bilateral and regional frameworks that focus on developing the Gulf Arab states’ own defense and intelligence capabilities through arms and technology sales, joint exercises, and greater regional integration. The United States remains uniquely capable of projecting power globally. Since the Gulf region is among the most strategically important to Washington’s interests, it should remain a focus for deployment of U.S. capabilities in missile defense, maritime security coordination, intelligence gathering and sharing, and alliance building.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have sought, but not yet achieved, treaty-bound bilateral security partnerships with Washington. To promote regional security and safeguard U.S. interests, the new administration should continue these discussions, even though a Trump Doctrine should, ideally, seek the broadest possible advantage by involving all six Gulf Arab states and, when possible, Israel. Senior U.S. officials should visit all Gulf states regularly, strengthen each of these bilateral relationships, and increase cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council, which links the Gulf Arab states together.

On the social and economic fronts, a more effective new Trump Doctrine would recognize the huge changes taking place as Gulf economies and societies transform through top-down reforms in labor markets, loosening of social restrictions, economic diversification, and energy transition. U.S. companies remain the Gulf’s preferred partners for foreign direct investment, AI, and broadening logistics and trade networks. In exchange for access to advanced U.S. technology and investment, Washington should insist that Gulf countries protect U.S. military technology and intellectual property and deepen and broaden their already extensive investments in the United States, as they committed to do when the president visited. This will extend the regional and global competitive advantages of both the United States and the Gulf in AI, data processing, and other valuable technologies while simultaneously growing both the Gulf and U.S. economies.

The Carter Doctrine earned its 45-year staying power through conceptual simplicity and the integration of political, economic, and military policy. The administration should roll the United States’ new political objectives, reciprocal economic opportunities, and calibrated security partnerships in the Gulf into one bite-sized package – a new Trump Doctrine. This new paradigm can ensure continued U.S. leadership in regional security and the transformations of the Gulf Arab states for the good of the region and the United States.

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