Russia’s Role in Iran’s Drone and Missile Gamble

Israel’s large-scale strikes on Iranian nuclear and military sites that began June 13 triggered a direct confrontation between the two states. In response, Iran launched waves of medium-range ballistic missiles and one-way attack drones under operation True Promise III – showing resolve but failing to deliver a decisive counterstrike. The situation escalated June 22 when the United States conducted limited airstrikes hitting three key Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran responded the next day with a symbolic missile attack on the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, signaling a desire to avoid further escalation. Hours later, President Donald J. Trump brokered a tenuous cease-fire between Iran and Israel.

As this fragile cease-fire keeps direct hostilities paused, a pressing question is whether – and how – Russia, Iran’s strategic partner, might help Tehran rebuild its military deterrent. Moscow relied on Iranian drones in Ukraine. Now that the situation is reversed, will Russia help Iran by providing weapons, restoring production capacity, upgrading designs, or advising on tactics to pressure Israeli defenses?

Iran’s Arsenal and Strategy, and the Scale of Response

Cost imposition lies at the heart of Iran’s deterrence doctrine: threatening punishing retaliation for attacks on its territory to dissuade foes from striking first. In this endeavor, missiles and drones are Iran’s main deterrence tools. A 2022 estimate by the U.S. Central Command put Tehan’s ballistic stockpile at 2,000 to 3,000 systems, with about one-third medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel. By June 21, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had fired around 500 of these missiles at Israel. Notably, early plans called for up to 1,000 missiles in a single wave, but Israeli airstrikes on launch sites, assassinations of senior IRGC leaders, and command disruption forced a sharp scale back. Iran also launched more than 1,000 drones – mainly Shahed 136, Arash 2, and Shahed 101. Vowing a “severe response,” Iranian leaders repeatedly framed each salvo as evidence of resolve.

However, the operational record tells a more sobering story. Israel’s multilayered air defense network – integrating Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow-2 and -3 systems, supported by two U.S.-deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense batteries and Aegis-equipped vessels – intercepted nearly 90% of the incoming ballistic missiles. Of the drones, fewer than one-fifth breached Israeli airspace, but none of them hit any targets. The Israeli air force intercepted most drones en route over Syria and likely even Saudi Arabia, while some of the others were disabled by the Jordanian air force over its territory.

Meanwhile, Israel’s offensive severely tested Iran’s “deterrence by punishment.” On the first night, the Israeli air force struck missile sites in Khorramabad, Kermanshah, and Tabriz, destroying launchers, radar nodes, and mobile batteries. First person view drones infiltrated by Israeli intelligence targeted air defense radars and command posts, further exposing Iran’s limited capacity to defend key sites. By June 16, Israel claimed it had destroyed around 120 launchers, roughly one-third of Iran’s prewar capacity. Over the following days, the Israel Defense Forces also reported preemptively neutralizing nearly 950 Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles before they could be launched at Israel.

Compared to Iran’s massive salvos in 2024, recent barrages were smaller but deadlier: at least 25 Israelis were killed and over 2,500 injured, mainly because Iran shifted to striking densely populated urban centers, including Tel Aviv and Haifa, instead of remote military outposts. This countervalue targeting reflects both tactical adaptation and strategic desperation to sustain its deterrent image despite a shrinking arsenal. Still, the strategic impact fell far short of forcing Israel to reconsider its air campaign. For now, the pause spares Tehran the dilemma of expending its remaining stockpile under sustained pressure – but if fighting resumes, the risk of rapid depletion looms large.

A Russian Blueprint for Rebuilding Deterrence

With missiles spent and production lagging, Iran faces an urgent need to rebuild. Systematic Israeli strikes on storage and production sites had Iran depleting its ballistic missile inventory faster than its modest output – around 50 per month – could replenish it. Tehran’s dilemma is also rooted in an uncomfortable truth: Its defense industrial base is smaller and less sophisticated than Israel’s, which is up to seven times larger.

Yet, some experts see these figures as a floor rather than a ceiling. Tehran’s predicament mirrors Russia’s dilemma in 2022: a vast civilian industrial base with only modest wartime mobilization. Manufacturing makes up about 20% of Iran’s economy, compared to 11.4% for Israel – a latent capacity that, if tapped, could sustain larger arms production. Iran’s auto sector alone builds over 1 million cars annually, demonstrating the depth of its supply chains, skilled labor, and access to raw materials – all of which are theoretically convertible to defense production if the political will exists. Its robust UAV industry also relies mainly on domestic airframes and basic electronics, with some smuggled imports despite sanctions.

Russia’s example shows how a state can adapt under pressure. In 2022, Moscow turned to Iranian drones to compensate for missile shortages. By late 2023, Russia had established localized production facilities, such as the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan followed by a second production line in Izhevsk in 2024. C4ADS estimates that Russia paid $1.75 billion for the technology, source code, and license production of more than 11,300 Shahed drones, allowing it to secure supply chains and scale production independently.

As of May, Russia had reached a daily production rate of approximately 170 Geran drones (upgrading and rebranding Shahed 136 and 238), alongside cheap decoys, such as Gerbera and Parody UAVs, with plans to increase this to 190 per day by year end. These newer versions include hardened navigation systems, jamming-resistant antennas, and specialized, heavier warheads – refinements tested in Ukraine.

Russia’s Shahed adaptation has grown into a linchpin of its deep-strike campaign. Since January 2023, Moscow has launched over 35,100 Shahed-type drones against Ukraine. Operationally, Russian tactics have also evolved: Massive swarms of drones, combined with decoys, have been launched from multiple directions to saturate radars and mislead air defenses – with daily attacks sometimes exceeding 450 systems simultaneously.

Despite a hit rate of just 10%, Shahed or Geran drones remain Russia’s most cost-effective strike munition: cheap to mass produce, hard to stop in waves, and able to terrorize civilian areas while exhausting high-end air defense stockpiles. Recent battlefield footage even shows Shaheds upgraded with artificial intelligence modules and direct radio-control systems, extending their flexibility and precision.

For Iran, the lesson is clear: If Moscow turned a foreign design into a relentless strike system, Tehran could try a similar ramp-up – tapping local industry and scattered workshops, even as a cease-fire pauses the fight. Early signs suggest this is already underway: Debris from downed drones shows tweaks similar to Russian models used in Ukraine, though, so far, only a handful of examples have surfaced.

However, direct Russian military aid is unlikely as long as regional security volatility remains high and threats persist. On June 23, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Moscow to meet President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and Director of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff Igor Kostyukov. While Putin condemned Israeli and U.S. strikes as “unprovoked,” he stopped short of pledging direct military support.

Despite this high-profile visit and Tehran’s subtle requests, Moscow has indeed reiterated that its 20-year strategic partnership with Iran, signed in January, is not a mutual defense pact. To date, Moscow has refrained from delivering more advanced military systems to Tehran. Instead, Russian officials have offered diplomatic support and mediation but avoided concrete military commitments – mindful of Israel’s redlines and wary of deeper Western sanctions. For now, the outcomes of Araghchi’s Moscow visit suggest that Moscow prefers a wait-and-see approach. Rather than risk immediate escalation, Moscow’s support will likely remain confined to quiet technical assistance, design tweaks, and diplomatic engagement.

Likewise, Russia must also delicately balance its support for Iran with its broader regional interests. The necessity of maintaining strong ties with regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and even Israel, limits the scope of Russian support for Tehran. Its engagement with Iran is therefore carefully calibrated to avoid alienating other key partners.

Given these limits, analysts expect Russia’s short- to mid-term military support to remain indirect and conditional on whether the situation in the region remains stable or not. If the cease-fire holds, Russia may focus on helping Tehran rebuild its deterrent gradually, through quiet technical upgrades, co-produced drones, and selective defense industry deals – such as spare part transfers, joint drone upgrades, or radar system enhancements.

Should Iran face existential threats, Russia may feel compelled to step up its support – likely still through indirect means, such as arms transfers, intelligence sharing, or cyber cooperation – to prevent regime collapse. Such action would serve to uphold deterrence while minimizing the risk of direct engagement with Western powers.

Plausible but risky actions could include quietly transferring improved Russian-assembled Geran drones to Iran, or providing key components and know-how to bolster Tehran’s domestic production; facilitating arms transfers via Russian territory of other Iran-aligned countries, such as North Korea, sharing early warning radar data (for instance, from the Kontayner over-the-horizon system); or boosting Iran’s regional proxy warfare by supplying advanced anti-ship missiles and drones to groups such as the Houthis. So far, there is no public evidence that Moscow has taken these steps – or intends to do so. Putin has even floated removing Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile as part of an off-ramp – a reminder that, for Moscow, stabilizing Iran means protecting its trade routes and avoiding a repeat of the sudden fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

Likewise, shifting civilian factories to arms production is easier said than done. Unlike Russia, which retooled its economy for war, Iran lacks the necessary legal and logistical frameworks to rapidly convert its consumer production. Still, experience from Israel’s sustained air campaign may push Tehran to adapt. Dispersed, concealed dual-use sites could complicate Israel’s future strike precision.

Escalation Options and Risk Calculations

With a fragile cease-fire now in place, Tehran’s focus will likely shift to rearmament and shoring up vulnerable stockpiles. But if the cease-fire collapses, its immediate escalation options are limited. Consequently, Iran could resort to other costly tactics to reassert its deterrent posture.

One option would be to intensify strikes on Israeli critical infrastructure – refineries, ports, power grids – which are harder to defend than military bases. The Haifa refinery was already hit early in the conflict, underscoring this risk. Such attacks could inflict economic pain and signal that Israel’s home front remains vulnerable if hostilities resume at full scale.

Closer to home, Tehran still holds a significant number of accurate short-range ballistic missiles and one-way attack drones that could again threaten Gulf oil terminals or U.S. bases in the region – as demonstrated by its strike against the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. It could also deploy advanced anti-ship missiles to harass tankers in the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea via the Houthis, disrupting global energy flows. However, these moves would endanger Iran’s fragile diplomatic thaw with Gulf neighbors and invite a new direct U.S. military response – precisely what Tehran seeks to avoid.

So far, Tehran’s restraint reflects survival logic with strategic calculus rather than a lack of capacity. Iranian officials know that escalating beyond symbolic retaliation risks turning limited conflict into a wider regional war that could draw in the United States and devastate the regime. By balancing its retaliation and preserving enough capacity to threaten regional U.S. bases and critical Gulf infrastructure, Tehran preserves diplomatic leverage and keeps pressure on Israel to uphold the cease-fire terms. Trump’s cease-fire announcement after the Al Udeid strike underscores this balancing act: a highly symbolic missile attack, followed immediately by a pause to de-escalate. Yet Israel’s air campaign has pushed Iran’s deterrence strategy to its limits. Once based on credible punishment via missiles, drones, and proxy pressure, that equation has collapsed, as Israel was able to absorb strikes, disable launchers, and degrade proxies. What remains is a fragile mix of rhetorical threats and last-resort weapons – including weapon-grade nuclear, held in reserve more to deter direct U.S. involvement than to change Israel’s core war aims.

For the Gulf states, this fragile equilibrium poses serious risks. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain spent years hedging against Iran through quiet diplomacy and reduced tensions, not out of friendship but to protect their energy exports and economic visions. Now, Israel’s deep strikes and Iran’s battered deterrence risk dragging the entire Gulf into the blast zone if Iran lashes out to compensate for its setbacks.

Likewise, Patriot, THAAD, and radars cannot guarantee immunity from layered salvos of drones, decoys, and missiles if properly organized. The UAE’s small territory and high density of critical infrastructure make it especially vulnerable. Gulf capitals urgently want one thing: the United States to stay out of the conflict with Iran so they do not become targets by association.

For Washington, the stakes are clear: Deterrence by sanctions will not suffice. Quiet mediation, credible off-ramps for Tehran, and pressure on Israel to limit escalation are vital to prolong the cease-fire, prevent conflict from expanding across the region, and test whether Moscow’s restrained support can keep Iran’s deterrence viable without triggering a wider war.

The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.