Train and Equip: The Threat of Houthi Partnerships in the Red Sea

The growing partnerships Yemen’s Houthis are cultivating with al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are a potential threat multiplier for Red Sea security and global supply chains. Weapons smuggling boosts this network, as the Houthis work to shape routes for provisions and revenue to complement their alliance with Iran. Through the transfer of technology and training from the Houthis, nonstate armed groups, such as al-Shabab and AQAP, can upgrade their capabilities, especially with drones, and amplify regional insecurity. The Gulf Arab states, the United States, and European states, therefore, share an interest in preventing these groups from developing a strong coordinated network.

Consolidating New Alliances

Recent reports by United Nations experts highlight how cooperation with nonstate armed groups in the Red Sea region is a growing financial, military, and political asset for the Houthis. An October 17, 2025 U.N. Security Council Panel of Experts report on Yemen indicated that cooperation between the Houthis and al-Shabab, the Somali affiliate of al-Qaeda, “has intensified.” Currently, ties involve “weapons smuggling, technical training, in relation to operational tactics, and exchange of logistical support.” The report confirmed the Houthis led Yemen-based training on manufacturing sophisticated improvised explosive devices and drone technology for al-Shabab fighters. In exchange for this training and military equipment, al-Shabab reportedly offered to capture and ransom more vessels in the Gulf of Aden to turn the focus away from the Red Sea, where Houthi attacks are concentrated. In early 2026, the Puntland Maritime Police Force deputy director of intelligence reported that some Somali pirate groups had acquired GPS satellite devices from the Houthis, which have allowed them “to accurately track the routes of commercial vessels.” A February 2025 Security Council report noted also that Somali intelligence had detected communications between the Houthis and Islamic State-Somalia Province, an affiliate of the Islamic State group and a rival of al-Shabab.

An October 11, 2025 Panel of Experts report examined the parallel collaboration between the Houthis and AQAP. The report noted that, since 2024, they have been “directly” coordinating operations against the U.N.-recognized Yemeni government and allied forces. The Houthis had reportedly agreed to supply AQAP with drones, thermal rockets, and explosive devices. The groups had also “discussed potential support by AQAP in attacks against maritime targets.” In areas of Yemen, the Houthis have provided training and medical treatment to AQAP fighters, according to the October 17 report. It also indicated that the Houthis are the “main suppliers and in control of smuggling activities” with al-Shabab and AQAP.

The Houthis’ strategy post-October 7, 2023 has focused on diversifying their financial and military alliances. The weakening of Iran and the “axis of resistance,” especially after the June 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran, has pushed the Houthis to diversify alliances to secure new supply chains for weapons and sources of financing through smuggling. And the attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and targeting Israel have helped the Houthis increase their visibility and regional standing, reaching a wider Muslim audience regardless of sect.

Nevertheless, the rise of a Houthi-driven network in the Red Sea complements Iran’s military support, it doesn’t replace it. The weapons smuggled in the Red Sea are often of Iranian origin and come from Iran. The Houthis’ consolidation of new alliances beyond Tehran – though not averse to the Iranian camp – allows the group to strengthen its military and political autonomy from Iran. At the same time, it serves Tehran’s influence in the Red Sea region, trying to compensate for setbacks in the Levant.

Rising Security Risks

The growing cooperation among the Houthis, al-Shabab, and AQAP has two main implications for regional security. The first is regarding smuggling routes: Weapons supply to the Houthis increasingly pass through smuggling routes in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, whose northern coast the U.N. Security Council noted is a “transit hub” for weapons destined for the Houthis, with “several smuggling routes running through Somalia to Yemeni ports.” This trend is likely to further destabilize the already fragile balance of the African coast of the Red Sea, raising new challenges for arms proliferation, coastal and trade security, and, ultimately, state sovereignty.

The second implication is armed groups’ upgraded capability and its effect on maritime security. Increased Houthi-driven cooperation with al-Shabab and AQAP could lead to intensified security risks for shipping lanes due to technical knowledge transfer, particularly related to drones. Al-Shabab currently uses drones only for surveillance purposes. However, according to U.N. experts, the Somali group is working “with the assistance of Houthis to develop capabilities for conducting drone attacks.” AQAP reportedly used drones for strikes against U.N.-recognized government forces for the first time in mid-2023, coinciding with the first reports of Houthi-AQAP cooperation.

Gulf-U.S.-Europe: Shared Strategic Interests

The Gulf Arab states, the United States, European countries, and many regional powers have much to lose if cooperation between nonstate armed groups grows in the Red Sea and would benefit from coordinated initiatives to stifle this network. This is especially important for Saudi Arabia, because its national security includes the Red Sea, with Vision 2030 projects on the western coast, the Yanbu oil export terminal, commercial ports, and undersea cables. It is also a shared security concern for the United Arab Emirates. Since the start of the Red Sea crisis in late 2023, attacks on shipping have disrupted traffic to the Suez Canal, severely affecting Egypt’s economy. They have also slowed the flow of commercial volumes at Jordan’s Aqaba port and disrupted tourism. Israel also has an interest in preventing the armed groups’ growing cooperation in the Red Sea region: The Houthis have launched attacks against Israel, and al-Shabab and AQAP share anti-Israel ideologies. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 is likely to increase ideological connections among these groups: Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi warned “any Israeli presence in Somaliland” would be considered a “military target.”

Joint initiatives among the Gulf Arab states, the United States, and European states may help disrupt this growing network. For example, intensified intelligence sharing could help to better target Houthi financing, smuggling, and weapons procurement. Likewise, supporting littoral states’ capacity building is key to boosting countersmuggling activities. A successful model may be the Yemen Maritime Security Partnership, which was established by Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Japan in September 2025 to fund, equip, and train the Yemeni coast guard in coordination with Yemen’s U.N.-recognized government. Since 2025, the Yemeni coast guard has significantly increased interceptions of ships carrying weapons, fuel, and drugs to the Houthis.

A similar multinational partnership could be explored for Somalia. Since the Somali coast guard and navy operate around Mogadishu and not in the area of interest for the Houthis’ smuggling, the United States and Gulf and European partners could focus on the empowerment of the Somaliland coast guard and Puntland Maritime Police Force, in coordination with Somalia’s federal government, although regional tensions generated by Israel’s recognition of Somaliland make this option more difficult to pursue than before. Nevertheless, the close coordination between the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces – in which Gulf Arab states participate – and EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta (now deployed off Somalia’s waters), would provide an already existing operative framework.

After the experience of the shipping crisis in the Red Sea, it is clear that time is key to defuse future security risks for the region.

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