Key Role of Gulf States in India-Pakistan Mediation

An April 22 attack by militant gunmen that killed 26 tourists in the Indian-administered Kashmir region brought the South Asian region to the brink of a full scale war between two nuclear powers. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by a Kashmiri rebel group, The Resistance Front, which is allegedly an offshoot of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiaba, a United Nations-designated terrorist organization.

The Indian government signaled that it held Pakistan and its security establishment responsible for the attack. India suspended a key water treaty, downgraded diplomatic ties, and closed its border with its western neighbor. Pakistan denied any role in the attack and, in tit for tat measures, downgraded its diplomatic ties and closed its air space to Indian airlines. The tensions escalated on May 7, when India launched a major military operation targeting nine locations in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir resulting in more than 30 deaths. In the ensuing aerial engagement between the two air forces, Pakistan shot down at least two Indian fighter planes, and both sides tested each other’s air defenses with swarms of drones. On May 9, India launched a missile attack on a critical logistical center at the Nur Khan base near the Pakistani capital and the country’s nuclear command headquarters. Pakistan responded the next day, launching missile and drone strikes inside India and Indian-administered Kashmir. This led to further Indian missile attacks against several Pakistani air bases. This escalating military confrontation only ended after President Donald J. Trump brokered a cease-fire between the two sides alongside vigorous diplomatic efforts by Gulf stakeholders, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Indian and Pakistani Ties With the Gulf States

After the independence of India and creation of Pakistan in 1947, both states attempted to court political stakeholders in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia was the most important political power in the region, and India and Pakistan developed cordial ties with the kingdom. During the 1950s, Saudi Arabia arguably had closer ties with India than with Pakistan due to Pakistan’s inclusion in Western-backed regional security alliances. Yet as Saudi statecraft took a pan-Islamist and staunchly anticommunist turn, its bilateral relationship strengthened with Pakistan, peaking during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s as both countries worked alongside the United States to push the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. This Cold War backdrop also defined the nature of engagement of other Gulf states with South Asia, leading to strong political and security ties with Pakistan. Additionally, they supported Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

This started to shift in the 2000s as the Gulf states recognized India’s growing economic clout and as a new generation of leaders came to power in the Gulf region. Furthermore, Pakistan’s failure to uphold its security commitments toward its Gulf partners, particularly its refusal to join the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, damaged its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. And Pakistan’s increased economic dependence on the Gulf states provided an indirect lift to India’s influence with Gulf states. Political, economic, and energy ties between the Gulf states and India have increased significantly. The Gulf states account for 40% of Indian oil imports. Similarly, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are India’s third- and fourth-largest trading partners respectively. This has contributed to the development of a strategic relationship between these Gulf states and India, leading to the signing of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor agreement during the 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi.

This strengthening of India’s relationship with the Gulf states – particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE – has altered the relatively Pakistan-aligned approach of Gulf states; they have increasingly come to take into account Indian concerns regarding terrorist attacks and violence in the disputed territory of Kashmir.

Saudi and UAE Mediation on Kashmir

The Gulf states’ first effort to de-escalate tensions between India and Pakistan was in the wake of the February 2019 Balakot crisis. Saudi and Emirati mediation attempts led to the release of an Indian pilot who was arrested after his plane was downed by Pakistan’s air force. And from late 2020 to 2021, the UAE led mediation efforts and brokered a cease-fire between the two South Asian neighbors on the de-facto border between the two sides in the Kashmir region.

The Emirati mediation was successful because of the UAE’s unique personal and political ties on both sides. The UAE leadership has forged a special relationship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has been honored with the UAE’s highest civil decoration, the Order of Zayed, and has visited the UAE six times in the last 10 years. Meanwhile, the UAE has invested more than $10 billion in Pakistan and remains its third-largest trading partner. Additionally, Emirati leaders had established close personal ties with General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan’s army chief at the time of the 2020-21 negotiations. The emphasis of the Pakistani security establishment at that time on geoeconomics rather than geopolitics also contributed toward reaching the cease-fire deal with India, and Pakistan also adopted a more refrained political attitude toward Kashmir and curbed its anti-India agitation. The 2021 cease-fire had held until the April attack.

This latest escalation started just after Modi landed in Riyadh for an official visit, and he had to cut his trip short and return to New Delhi. This was followed by phone conversations between Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan and the foreign ministers of Pakistan and India. In a social media post, India’s foreign minister made it clear the attack in Kashmir was discussed during the call with his Saudi counterpart. But a statement from the Pakistani side emphasized a rejection of Indian allegations and Pakistan’s resolve to respond to any aggression. These conversations suggested that the political environment on both sides was perhaps too charged for mediation efforts to be successful at the time, and neither side had been willing to make any concessions.

The factors that contributed to the 2021 Emirati brokered cease-fire agreement were no longer in place. On the Indian side, there remained a clear resolve to strike Pakistan. In Pakistan, the new military chief didn’t appear to have a similar personalized relationship with the Emirati ruling elite that his predecessor, Bajwa, had. Although Army Chief General Asim Munir has met Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan several times, and an Emirati delegation recently visited to offer condolences regarding the death of Munir’s mother, it appears that both sides might not share a similar regional vision – particularly with Munir’s confrontational approach and aggressive rhetoric toward India. At the same time, Emirati ties have become closer with India than with Pakistan. All these factors may have contributed to the initial hesitance of the UAE to intervene this time around. Yet, as the military confrontation ignited between the two sides, all the Gulf Arab states as well as Iran used their diplomatic channels to end the conflict and restore communication between India and Pakistan.

Most importantly, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir made back-to-back trips to New Delhi and Islamabad. Saudi diplomacy was instrumental in restraining Pakistan from immediately responding to India. Similarly, as the conflict escalated, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan coordinated with the U.S. secretary of state while also remaining in contact with the leaderships in both New Delhi and Islamabad. Eventually, it was the pressure from the United States that compelled both sides to agree to a cease-fire, but the actual diplomatic groundwork was done by Saudi Arabia.

Still, this episode highlights the limitations faced by Gulf state mediators, particularly in complex security environments positioning nuclear powers against each other where the sides perceive the need to act to establish their deterrence thereby leading to escalation. Further, the hypernationalist environments in India and Pakistan presented a challenge to getting the ruling elites to stand down. However, these developments demonstrate the power of Gulf states as mediators and the value of their ability to coordinate with U.S. political muscle.

The views represented herein are the author's or speaker's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSI, its staff, or its board of directors.