Is There a Case for Normalizing Relations With Assad?

At the May Arab League summit in Jeddah, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad made a triumphant return to the community of Arab states after a 12-year suspension following his brutal response to protests during the Arab Spring uprisings. Proponents of normalizing relations with the Assad regime believe that engaging with the regime will allow Arab states to pressure Damascus to rein in drug traffickers who have flooded the region with dangerous amphetamines, make sure Syria is not entirely in thrall to Iran, and help improve the living conditions of the Syrian population.

Is reengaging with the Assad regime the right move? And what results have Arab states’ reengagement with the regime brought so far? While Washington is certain not to follow suit, should the administration of President Joseph R. Biden Jr. stay the course in not trying to force Arab countries to reverse course? And how should the United States and its Western allies, currently maintaining layers of economic sanctions on the regime, work with these countries as they try to make Damascus less destabilizing and dangerous? And will such cooperation make it more difficult to hold Assad and his regime accountable?

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