Turkish-Saudi Convergence in the New Middle East

During his recent trip to the Middle East, President Donald J. Trump may not have noticed a major regional realignment. After years of animosity, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are poised to turn their uneasy detente into a significant partnership. For perhaps the first time, regional and global shifts have aligned in favor of these two Sunni powers vying to become architects of a new regional order. Ankara and Riyadh have good reasons to be ambitious. Iran is diminished, Egypt is absent, and Israel remains tactically bold but strategically adrift. The United States and Russia have other military and strategic priorities, while China lacks the appetite and capacity to reshape the Middle East. This power vacuum gives Ankara and Riyadh room to assert themselves with unprecedented harmony.

This doesn’t mean competition and friction will vanish. But for now, alignment appears stronger than rivalry. The emerging Turkish-Saudi entente, forged around shared interests and a common strategic vision – that seeks strategic autonomy and strategic capacity – could shift the balance of power in the Middle East in ways the United States can work with, even if Israel cannot. While Israel demands confrontation with Iran, Ankara and Riyadh prefer engagement. Where Israel favors a weak Syria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia want a stable Sunni-led state. And while Israel resists Palestinian statehood, Turkey and Saudi Arabia may push for it.

These diverging visions of the Middle East will force the Trump administration to confront difficult choices. Trump’s willingness to engage in nuclear diplomacy with Iran and his surprising move toward lifting U.S. sanctions on Syria are good news for the emerging alliance between Riyadh and Ankara. If Trump continues to take steps in the direction of diplomatic engagement on issues such as Iran, Syria, and Palestinian statehood, he has a rare chance to leave the Middle East more stable than he found it.

Factors Behind an Unlikely Alliance 

Whether the Ankara-Riyadh partnership endures will hinge on four key factors – starting with Syria. A post-Bashar al-Assad Syria free of Iranian control is a strategic win for Saudi Arabia. And Turkey, widely seen as the architect of that outcome, now holds the upper hand. Turkish troops remain in the northwest, a defense pact with Damascus is in the works, and Ankara plans – much to Israel’s irritation – to build a military base in central Syria. But Erdogan is wary of appearing too dominant. He wants to avoid provoking Arab or Israeli backlash and knows Turkey cannot shoulder Syria’s reconstruction alone. Saudi – with other Gulf – financial backing isn’t just welcome – it’s essential.

Ahmed al-Sharaa, previously a jihadist who is now the leader of Syria’s transitional government, made his first foreign visit not to Ankara but to Riyadh – where he was warmly received by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Saudi Arabia has long-standing ties with Syrian Arab tribes, and Mohammed bin Salman clearly sees strategic opportunity in postwar Syria. But challenging Turkey isn’t part of the plan. Why pick a fight when Erdogan is eager for financial deals that benefit Turkish firms – and when Ankara shares Riyadh’s core goals? Both want a stable, unified Syria free of Iranian control, jihadist threats, ethnic fragmentation, and Israeli land grabs.

Nonetheless, Erdogan’s hopes for a flood of Saudi cash powering Turkish-led reconstruction in Syria may be overly optimistic. Riyadh may have deep pockets, but falling oil prices and an ambitious Vision 2030 agenda mean its spending abroad will be limited – and geared toward boosting Saudi firms, not Turkish ones. Ultimately, both Ankara and Riyadh understand that real reconstruction hinges on one thing: lifting Western sanctions. And on that front, they’ve been lobbying in lockstep, and Trump’s recent decision proves that they are succeeding.

A key driver of Turkish-Saudi convergence is the deepening defense partnership. Turkey’s thriving military-industrial sector is becoming central to Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, which prioritizes localization and co-production. Unlike Western defense firms, Turkey offers Riyadh flexible terms and joint manufacturing opportunities. With a $6 billion arms deal already signed – including unmanned aerial vehicles, tanks, and warships – Turkey could soon count Saudi Arabia as its top defense market. The real game changer, however, is Riyadh’s interest in acquiring 100 KAAN stealth fighter jets – Turkey’s answer to the United States’ F-35.

The KAAN fighter jet achieved its maiden flight in February 2024, and Ankara sees this ambitious project as the culmination of its long-term investments in the country’s defense technology and industrial base, which gained further momentum when the country was ejected from the F-35 project after purchasing Russian S-400 missile defense systems. Time will tell whether Turkey can bring to full fruition the KAAN project, given Ankara’s technological dependency on external partners regarding the jet’s engine and propulsion platform. Based on current estimates, the KAAN program can gain scale and cost efficiency by 2029. Riyadh’s consideration of a triple-digit purchase will certainly help with output at scale and lowering unit pricing. If that deal goes through, it could help transform bilateral ties into a full-fledged strategic alliance.

Turkish-Saudi alignment extends to Iran. While once deeply divided over how to handle Tehran, today both countries see engagement – not escalation – as the pragmatic course. Riyadh’s backing of U.S. nuclear diplomacy reflects a shift driven by painful lessons: Washington’s failure to respond to the 2019 Aramco attacks and the waning reliability of U.S. security guarantees. Ankara’s long-standing support for nuclear talks and economic ties with Iran used to frustrate the Saudis. Now, both sides see dialogue as necessary – if only to buy time and avoid regional chaos. That doesn’t mean they trust Tehran. Neither shed tears over the military setbacks of Iranian-backed Hezbollah. But they now prefer containment through diplomacy, not confrontation.

Another pillar of convergence is the Palestinian question. Both Erdogan and Mohammed bin Salman have grown more vocal in their criticism of Israel’s war in Gaza and Washington’s support for it. Riyadh’s insistence on Palestinian statehood as a prerequisite for the normalization of ties with Israel mirrors Ankara’s position. The two still diverge on Hamas – Erdogan calls Hamas members freedom fighters, Riyadh keeps its distance – but both agree that a two-state solution is the only viable path forward. Now both see strategic value in pushing back against Israeli intransigence.

Beneath foreign policy, a subtler convergence is unfolding. Politically, Turkey and Saudi Arabia remain strange bedfellows. Yet Erdogan’s one-man rule and Mohammed bin Salman’s top-down modernization reflect a shared model that is patrimonial, centralized, nationalist, and allergic to democracy and liberalism. Saudi Arabia’s embrace of nation building – nationalist pride over religious identity and rapid cultural modernization – bears an uncanny resemblance, allowing for monumental change implicit over the course of a century, to Turkey’s 1930s-era top-down transformation. In turn, Turkey under Erdogan resembles a 21st-century sultanate.

Larger Relevance for the Middle East and Washington

Looking at the broader picture, the emerging Turkish-Saudi convergence has major implications for both Middle East stability and U.S. foreign policy. For Washington, Turkish and Saudi influence in Syria is far preferable to Iran’s grip over the crumbling Assad regime. Recent reports that Syrian Kurds have agreed to integrate their forces into the Syrian army offer an off-ramp for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and for Trump, who is eager to end the U.S. military presence there. Stabilizing Syria with Turkish-Saudi support – and gradually lifting sanctions to enable basic governance – is a strategic win for the United States.

Turkish-Saudi alignment on Iran is equally significant. Trump’s team appears increasingly open to diplomacy, and this time Riyadh is, too. Unlike 2015, Saudi Arabia now sees value in engagement – especially compared to the risks of an Israeli-led military strike, which would almost certainly provoke regional retaliation and attendant economic and environmental blowback for Gulf Arab countries. A renewed deal could contain Iran’s nuclear program while opening space to address broader security concerns down the line.

The final area of convergence is on Palestine. Riyadh continues to tie normalization with Israel to progress on a two-state solution – an approach that should normally create real incentives for the United States and Israel to reengage with the Palestinian Authority. Despite his willingness to engage both Iran and the new Syria, Trump remains reluctant to push for U.S. diplomacy on Palestine. At the end of the day, Washington has a clear choice: It can follow Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s intransigent path – fueling Iran’s narrative and prolonging instability – or listen to the more pragmatic Saudi-Turkish approach about diplomacy for a Palestinian state.

As Netanyahu discovered during his last visit to the Oval Office, Trump’s instincts on Iran, Syria, and Turkey will not always align with Israel’s. Which vision Trump chooses may well determine whether this Turkish-Saudi moment becomes a regional breakthrough or a missed opportunity.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U. S. Government.

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